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Abstract
In his 1947 work Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command,
historian S. L. A. Marshall convinced the U.S. government and military of the critical
need for improved techniques in combat psychology. However, his more
fundamental assertion that soldiers needed to be trained to overcome an innate
psychological resistance to killing would prompt some in the military as well as
scholars and medical experts to examine the heart and mind of the soldier in combat.
As a result, an emergent science called killology became a critical component in the
U.S. military’s quest to better train soldiers for the rigors of combat. This thesis will
explore the development of sophisticated technology and training techniques used by
the U.S. military to create soldiers that were more efficient at killing in combat.
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Introduction

As a young boy I was fascinated by the momentousness of war and the
profound impact it has had on the course of history. At that time my perception of
warfare was one of awe: I was fascinated by the resplendent heraldry of medieval
knights, the aesthetic symmetry found in the Napoleonic Era line of battle, and the
élan demonstrated by both the North and South during the American Civil War. As I
grew older and more thoughtful, my fascination with human conflict took an entirely
different path; I no longer viewed war through the lens of childhood naiveté. Instead,
I became infatuated with the titanic scale and dizzying cost of industrialized total war.
Leo Tolstoy most succinctly summarized my thoughts on this when he wrote, “War
has always interested me; not war in the sense of maneuvers devised by great generals
. . . but the reality of war, the actual killing. I was more interested to know in what
way and under the influence of what feelings one soldier kills another than to know
how the armies were arranged at Austerlitz and Borodino.” While I have come to
appreciate the science of war, it was while I was researching the Eastern Front during
World War II, that I began to fixate on how it must have been for the men of the
doomed German 6th Army at Stalingrad in 1943. Close to a million men knew that
misery and death was all that awaited them as the Red Army completed an
encirclement of the city. However, in order to help myself wrestle with the
magnitude of this tragedy, I needed to narrow my focus on the smallest basic unit of
warfare – the individual soldier. This thesis examines the historical origins of

1

killology, its essential components, and its influence on the techniques currently used
by the U.S. military to train men and women to overcome their natural aversion to
killing. In a broader context, I examine combat psychology in the U.S. military and
the myriad improvements in training programs, technology, and tactical organization
of combat units that produce more lethal soldiers.
How does the U.S. combat soldier overcome the innate human discomfort
towards violence, especially the kind of violence experienced during war? How does
the same soldier perform once engaged in combat? What are the environmental,
psychological, and technological factors that determine how this soldier will perform
in a fight? What emotions does the soldier experience before, during, and after the
battle? These are just a few of the questions that prompted my investigation into the
various methods used by the U.S. military to train troops for battle. After starting my
research into military training, I began encountering references in the literature to a
new discipline that was being adopted by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps in an
effort to make killing easier.
Killology, a term coined by scholar David Grossman, is described as the study
of the psychological and physiological effects of killing and combat on the human
psyche. Though scholars and medical doctors have examined this subject since
antiquity, in recent decades the U.S. military has made a concerted effort to research,
design, and apply training programs with the objective of helping soldiers overcome
the psychological constraints associated with killing. A newspaper article from 2006,
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titled “The Science of Creating Killers: Human Reluctance to Take a Life Can be
Reversed Through Training in the Method Known as Killology,” caught my attention,
and I began to explore the subject. I wanted to know the impact of psychological
conditioning on U.S. soldiers, and how this is achieved. In most cases I examine the
U.S. Army specifically, though the United States Marine Corps and Air Force are also
discussed.
Chapter One identifies the problem; an unduly large proportion of soldiers in
World War II were not firing their weapons at the enemy. While Marshall was
assigned to the European and Pacific Theaters during World War II he observed
many instances in which U.S. infantry and Marines failed to take part in combat.
This was not due to cowardice, as he initially suspected; rather, deep psychological
factors influenced the soldiers’ refusal to perform their duty in combat. Marshall
called this the “ratio of fire,” and he determined only around 15% of soldiers in direct
combat fire their weapons at the enemy. During World War II he helped record and
improve training methods, and he is widely credited with making debriefings
commonplace throughout the U.S. armed forces. His work with the U.S. military
continued after World War II and took him to both Korea and Vietnam. Marshall’s
research methods have been criticized in recent years; yet despite this, his influence
on the development of combat psychology and enhanced fighting techniques is
indisputable.

3

The second chapter examines Marshall’s observations in Korea and the major
reforms in the U.S. military that came as a reaction to the Cold War and shifting
strategic defense obligations. The conflict in Korea pushed the U.S. Army to
modernize; the result was significant structural changes to unit composition. The
changes in unit structure in combination with technological advances in weaponry
resulted in an improved ratio of fire. Some tentative steps toward enhanced
psychological conditioning of troops also began in Korea, though nothing like that
which occurred during the Vietnam Era.
Chapter Three follows Marshall to Vietnam, where he determined that
enhanced training techniques in combination with improved fighting doctrine created
a ratio of fire around 90%. An examination of the changes in training and technology
during the Vietnam War revealed a startling finding. Though rates of fire had been
significantly improved, what was the psychological cost? As it turns out, it was
significant. The average human can be conditioned to kill, and in some cases may
take some satisfaction in the act, but there is almost always a risk of significant
psychological trauma. The consequences of operant conditioning without adequate
post-event treatment created a generation of emotionally wounded veterans.
Finally, Chapter Four looks at the many ways the U.S. military integrated
concepts based in killology with the modern training regimen of combat troops. On
July 12, 2016, a pair of Apache attack helicopters killed a group of Iraqis, including
two combat journalists. The incident may have remained hidden were it not for a
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WikiLeaks release of a videotape of the event stored in the Apache’s onboard
computer. As horrific as the results of the attack were, the incident illustrated the
power of technology in combination with psychological enablers that allowed people
to kill in such a remorseless manner. A breakdown of combat psychology in action is
followed by an examination of government documents that indicate killology had a
significant influence on the development of modern military training. Lastly, I
examine how unmanned vehicles and computer technology are transforming the
nature of combat training and warfare. The potential psychological consequences of
the use of drone and video game technology to train America’s military is not yet
entirely understood. However, the lethal results achieved by the use of this emergent
technology for combat is indisputable.

5

Chapter One

World War II and the Ratio of Fire
War has always interested me; not war in the sense of maneuvers devised by great
generals . . . but the reality of war, the actual killing. I was more interested to know in
what way and under the influence of what feelings one soldier kills another than to
know how the armies were arranged at Austerlitz and Borodino.
—Leo Tolstoy

“Who was the first man to fire at an enemy during the advance?” the bulldoglike lieutenant colonel asked the assembled men of Company B of the 184th Infantry
Regiment who had gathered around a makeshift blackboard on the small Pacific atoll
of Kwajalein. Acclimated to the oppressive tropical heat that had been a constant
companion since the beginning of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign in
November of 1943, these veterans of the hellish fighting against the Japanese Empire
were engrossed in the conversation. They listened and responded to the questions
posed by the colonel and his assistants, despite some of them being injured. 1
A handful of men pointed to the individual responsible for opening fire.
Obliged to stand up, he recounted his actions before his comrades who occasionally
would add a corrective piece of information to the story. Furiously scribbling notes
into a weather-beaten notebook the colonel conducting the investigation, Samuel

1

Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall, Island Victory: The Battle of Kwajalein Atoll (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 2001), 2.
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Lyman Atwood Marshall, or “SLAM” Marshall as he was fond of calling himself,
was capturing the man’s story as part of his official duty as an officer in the recently
established U.S. Historical Division of the General Staff.
“How much fire was coming against you at this time?” Marshall asked. A
dozen or so men raised their hands to address the question. Lieutenant Allen E.
Butler spoke up and identified the real tactical problem he noticed concerning the
engagement in question “the two platoons, which were supposed to stay close abreast
as they drove forward in the battle, split away from each other because of the
ground.” 2
Then Klatt and Kaplan, the lieutenants of the offending platoons, each
recounted their own version of the situation. It became apparent that neither had a
clear understanding of how the engagement was unfolding and ultimately their lack of
coup d’oeil led to unnecessary casualties. 3 The consequences of the fog of war,
Clausewitz’s term for uncertainty in combat, prompted Marshall to later write
“Commanders of units do not—cannot—see the whole action.” As banal as this
statement may seem today, in 1943 the U.S. armed forces were just emerging as a
professional army, and by revisiting practical lessons about battle tactics, Marshall
hoped to save American lives.

2

Ibid,. 5.
Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: N. Trubner, 1873),
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h.htm. ii 25, 58-59.
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The severely wounded company commander captain Charles A. White made
it a point to sit in on this after-battle review hoping to make sense of the previous
day’s action. Marshall asked the captain “Were the tanks with you?” He answered;
“No, they didn’t get up in time and we jumped off on time without them. I don’t
know why they failed us.” 4 Again, scribbling in his notebook, Marshall concluded
that this was a question that needed to be answered by battalion headquarters and the
armor commanders. This back and forth continued until the battery of questions
Marshall asked were answered to his satisfaction.
Two important discoveries made by Marshall and his team during their time
with the 7th Infantry Division in the Marshall and Gilbert Island campaigns resulted in
new possibilities for research in both academic and military circles. First was the
conceptualization and implementation of after action report (AAR). The second,
predicated upon information discovered during AARs, was the ratio-of-fire theory
central to modern combat psychology.
Unbelievably, when the U.S. entered the Second World War in 1941, military
theorists and tacticians had overlooked the immense value of a structured debriefing
that allowed combatants to analyze, synthesize, and learn from the group’s combined
experience in battle. Marshall identified this shortcoming in military procedure as a
missed opportunity to gather useful data about the nature of fighting in the Pacific and
later in Europe. Through trial and error, he refined the group interview process
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Marshall, Island Victory, 5.
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further as he searched for more productive methods of teasing information out
participants. 5 His genius was that he oriented this process towards dealing with the
special kind of hell an infantryman experienced in combat. As the men took turns
relating their thoughts and experiences, Marshall recorded their insights. He later
them into compiled into a database of oral history from that he used to identify which
tactics were being successfully used by combat infantry and which were useless.
Prior to Marshall’s arrival at Kwajalein, aviators of the U.S. Army Air Force
had been using a somewhat similar procedure for debriefing airmen following a
bombing run or fighter patrol, though the reason for this was fundamentally different
than Marshall’s sessions with the infantry. With the fliers, post-mission round-ups
were oriented towards gathering the quantitative results of a bombing run or
analyzing new intelligence from reconnaissance patrol missions. They were not
designed to explicitly seek understanding of the mental rigors of battle the airmen
faced and were in many cases solely concerned with metrics. This was because the
needs of the different branches of service differed significantly.
The mental and emotional toll of killing with bombs or wing-mounted guns
was arguably a less visceral horror than U.S. combat infantrymen were likely to
encounter. 6 The emotional and psychological differences between fighting in the air
or on the ground determined the nature and value of the AAR to those who
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Frederic Smoler, “The Secret Of The Soldiers Who Didn’t Shoot,” American Heritage 40, no. 2
(1989): 1-3.
6
David Grossman, On Killing:The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (New
York: Back Bay Books, 1995), 97-98.
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participated. The infantry at Makin or Kwajalein appeared especially to appreciate
Marshall’s system for its mixture of tactical review and therapeutic catharsis. The
AAR’s organized and refined by Marshall were officially adopted by the U.S.
military in phases throughout the 1950s. 7 Today the AAR is a debriefing technique
used by all first-rate militaries around the globe and is considered indispensable as a
tool for training the next generation of servicemen and women.
The second discovery made by Marshall concerned the individual soldier’s
experience in combat and was a direct result of the insight he had gained from the
group interviews he recorded. In his most widely debated work, Men Against Fire:
The Problem of Battle Command in Future War, Marshall put forth his most
controversial and commonly cited observation: most soldiers in combat did not want
to kill. As one might expect, this counterintuitive statement captured the attention of
the military establishment. The investigation of this claim led to a reevaluation of
U.S. infantry doctrine and combat training, but not before raising a host of new
questions by psychologists, sociologists, and military historians looking to further
understand how soldiers can be trained to kill more efficiently while at war. 8
Marshall inadvertently stumbled upon a fundamental question about the
psychological capacity of humans to kill one another in combat.

7

F. D. G. Williams and Susan Canedy, SLAM : The Influence of S.L.A. Marshall on the United States
Army (Ft. Monroe: Office of the Command Historian, 1990), 69.
8
Paul Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989), 7-9.
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This sacrosanct topic, long considered taboo and unsuitable for general
consumption, is at the heart of recent scholarship in the field of killology, or the study
of killing as defined by its founder Lieutenant Colonel David Grossman. Grossman is
a former professor of Psychology at West Point and is considered a foremost expert
on human aggression and killing. He is currently directing The Warrior Science
Group, an organization dedicated to researching violent crime, and the psychological
cost of killing.
When Marshall and his associates recorded the personal experiences of men in
battle they unwittingly created a database of narratives that have become integral to
the work of scholars like Grossman. Perhaps more significant than the data they
collected, their interviews pierced the veil of secrecy surrounding what is for many
soldiers their most intimate experience in war—killing. This work examines the
development of combat psychology in the U.S. military since World War II. This will
include an examination of the works of S.L.A. Marshall, the ratio-of-fire, killology,
emergent technology, and training doctrines used presently and in the past. By
compiling and analyzing research directly associated with this subject, ideally this
thesis will in some small measure contribute to further understanding of this
uncomfortable and therefore often neglected topic.

Killing
…there man's courage is best decided, where the man who is a coward and
the brave man show themselves clearly: the skin of the coward changes colour one
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way and another, and the heart inside him has no control to make him sit steady, but
he shifts his weight from one foot to another, then settles firmly on both feet, and the
heart inside his chest pounds violent as he thinks of the death spirits, and his teeth
chatter together: but the brave man's skin will not change colour, nor is he too much
frightened, once he has taken his place in the hidden position, but his prayer is to
close as soon as may be in bitter division…
—The Iliad

The earliest known archeological evidence of battle can be found near the Nile
River on the border of what is today Egypt and Sudan, dating back 15,000 years. The
Sumerians used carvings and paintings to depict organized warfare three millennia
before the birth of Christ. In Laconia, the Spartans considered martial prowess the
highest virtue and organized their entire society around warfare and warrior principles
that are still used today in Western military doctrine. 9 The heroic actions of King
Leonidas at Thermopylae sparked the imagination of poets and bards who kept his
memory alive throughout the ages, a tradition that is now maintained by Hollywood
in the form of blockbuster movies.
Homer’s Iliad, a war story in dactylic hexameter, has been adapted repeatedly
by screenwriters and playwrights for modern consumption, demonstrating a lasting
fascination with the wartime escapades of the ancient Greeks. Arguably, Homer’s
work remains relevant today not simply because of the heroics exhibited by the
characters, but because the individuals he wrote about faced complicated and timeless
emotional and spiritual dilemmas. Homer used them to reveal aspects of human
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John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 242-43.
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nature that are uncomfortable for many to consider, including the fear or thrill one
feels before battle or the wrenching pain of losing a comrade. In choosing to write
about this often unseen aspect of war, Homer added a layer of complexity and depth
to his subjects in an effort to reveal the varied emotional and psychological
dimensions of warfare. Hektor and Achilles are endearing characters in the Iliad
precisely because they exhibit the full spectrum of emotions associated with killing
and warfare, not in spite of it. The tears Achilles sheds over the slain Patroclus are no
different than those shed by countless others in battle throughout history.
The Romans moved away from endemic warfare common to societies of the
Classical period and instead forged an empire through total war. For two hundred
years Roman expansion had meant the death or enslavement of thousands of people.
The appearance of the Aquila of Rome portended doom for their military and civilian
opponents. If not killed outright, their conquered foes were often sent to die on the
blood-soaked sands of the Flavian Amphitheatre as tribute to the glory of Rome. The
lust for death and violence permeated Roman society and was institutionally
sanctioned as a means of reinforcing values important to the ruling class and the
military. 10 The citizenry reveled in the pageantry and sadism of gladiatorial events –
fascinated by the spectacle of gruesome murder, blood, and mayhem.
Yet even in an environment of unfettered state-condoned violence, killing for
the individual was still a traumatic affair for all involved. Take for example Seneca
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Ibid., 146-47, 263-64.
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the Younger’s writing about a midday trip to the Colosseum in Rome and what he
witnessed:

In the morning, men are thrown to lions and bears. At mid-day they
are thrown to the spectators themselves. No sooner has a man killed,
than they shout for him to kill another, or to be killed. The final victor
is kept for some other slaughter. In the end, every fighter dies. And all
this goes on while the arena is half empty.
You may object that the victims committed robbery or were
murderers. So what? Even if they deserved to suffer, what's your
compulsion to watch their sufferings? 'Kill him', they shout, 'Beat him,
burn him'. Why is he too timid to fight? Why is he so frightened to kill?
Why so reluctant to die? They have to whip him to make him accept
his wounds. 11
Seneca observed that even when faced with imminent death and an
opportunity for deliverance existed, butchering another human in cold blood
was too much for many to bear. His description of individuals paralyzed with
fear at the prospect of killing, regardless of the fact that doing so could mean
saving their own lives, matches modern accounts of soldiers and law
enforcement officers as we will see in Chapter Three.
The Romans and Greeks are just two examples of societies that
embraced and reinforced martial prowess and killing at odds with the timidity
displayed above, though many more such examples exist.12 One could choose
to examine Samurai society in Japan during the Sengoku period, the
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Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Seneca: Letters From A Stoic, trans. Robin Campbell (New York: Penguin
Press, 1969), 41-43.
12
Gwynne Dyer, War (New York: Crown Publishers, 1985), 26.
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Mongolian war bands of the thirteenth century, or the Maori clans of New
Zealand and find they shared many of the same cultural values associated with
killing. 13,14,15 The key point is that regardless of a fascination with warfare
and culturally reinforced norms that advocated bloodshed as a virtue –
plunging a sword into another human’s body was no easy thing.
During his time as a combat historian, Marshall rediscovered this truth
about killing through his discussions with fighting men. By observing their
behavior on the sun-bleached beaches of the Pacific and in the frozen
windswept forests of the Ardennes, he prompted the American military
establishment to reexamine and reflect upon its training doctrines. Ultimately
this line of inquiry resulted in many of the programs and methods used today
to train U.S. combat soldiers to overcome inherent resistance to taking life.
Killology as a burgeoning field of study today would not exist if it were not
for Marshall’s pioneering research on the behavior of men in combat.

“Slam”
Good God, you must be dumber than I thought. Your initials spell SLAM and
you don't realize that's money in the bank? It's perfect for a sports editor. It's
perfect for anything. Nobody can forget that name.
—Tad Dorgan
13

John Keegan and Richard Holmes, Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle (New York: Viking, 1986),
16-18, 50.
14
Stephen Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History (New York: Routledge, 1977), 106-8.
15
Keith Sinclair, The Origins of the Maori Wars (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2013), 11316.
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While never claiming to be a scholar of warfare, Samuel Lyman Atwood
Marshall certainly was a participant. Born at the turn of the century in Catskill, New
York and raised in El Paso, Texas he was the son of a brickmaker. He served in the
First World War as a sergeant in the 315th Engineers of the 90th Division after leaving
school to enlist at the age of seventeen. There he witnessed first-hand the terrible cost
of war. During the Second World War Marshall reentered the U.S. Army in 1942 as
a major in the Information Branch, Special Service Division pf the War Department.
By 1943 and now a lieutenant colonel, Marshall was assigned to the newly
established Historical Division of the General Staff (G-2), which was mainly
concerned with recording the operational and administrative histories of the armed
services.
Under the auspices of President Roosevelt, this program was implemented to
collect and record the wartime experiences of U.S. forces around the world something
that was beyond the limited capabilities of the existing War College historical
section. 16 F.D.R. and top military advisors accurately believed that by producing a
series of historical monographs that critically examined specific military operation,
U.S. commanders and their men could potentially benefit from the analysis provided.
Marshall was immediately tasked with writing a definitive analysis of the recently
conducted Doolittle Raid on Tokyo.

16

John E. Jessup and Robert W. Coakley, A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History
(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1979), 287-92.
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Toward the end of 1943, Marshall and his team were attached to the 27th
Infantry Division during the assault on Makin Atoll in the Gilbert Islands, and later as
part of the 7th Infantry Division at Kwajalein Island. During these campaigns
Marshall developed the methodology behind the AARs he used to investigate the
experience of soldiers in combat. 17 His methodology relied heavily upon group
interviews and first-hand witnesses, leading some to challenge his methods, yet his
conclusions were generally insightful. Following his work in the Pacific in June of
1944, he was sent on temporary assignment to the European Theater of Operations
where he applied his AAR technique to veterans of the D-Day landings in Normandy
and of the Ardennes campaign. He would remain in Europe until the end of the war,
and in 1945 was promoted to theater historian. A year later he returned to the U.S.
and continued his career as a journalist for the The Detroit News, his employer since
1927.
It is worth briefly mentioning Marshall’s career as a journalist and editorial
writer before and after the war, as this has been called a blessing and a curse by both
his benefactors and detractors with regards to his contributions to reform in the U.S.
military. Some historians and members of the military have argued that because
Marshall spent the majority of his non-military life as a journalist, the tradecraft he
learned working first for the El Paso Herald and then in Detroit, trained him to focus

17

Williams and Canedy, SLAM, 21-2.
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on the crux of an issue. F.D.G. Williams, in his book SLAM: The Influence of S.L.A.
Marshall on the United States, writes the following about the subject:

Marshall's hallmark was his keenness for detail and his eye for the
dramatic. He was adept at telling a story full of color and excitement, a
story which often focused on the activities of common people
accomplishing uncommon things. Such stories found their way into
volumes of articles and books which caught the interest of many and
served as Marshall's vehicle for presenting his ideas and insights. The
color and simplicity of his writing style assured him a strong
following. Without this dramatic and yet simple style, he could not
have contributed as much as he did to military affairs. 18
This writing style endeared Marshall to many and aided him in his rise to
prominence as a journalist-historian. This also serves to highlight the fact that
Marshall was by training a journalist, and his efforts did not include scientific
methodology as it is currently practiced in sociology, political science and
psychology. For this reason he has been accused of being less scholar and
more newsman, indulging in sensationalist writing associated with journalism
of the time. But, beyond his scholarly and journalistic talent, Marshall’s
personality also won him many friends and allies among his colleagues, and
when in the service, his superiors and subordinates. 19
Marshall has been described as bold, flamboyant, gregarious, and
ambitious –excellent traits for a newsman and a combat historian. Williams
describes Marshall as “seemingly indomitable” and “He was what some

18
19

Ibid., 6-7.
Ibid.
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people would call a character.” Both of these traits helped win him the
respect of the men he interviewed and among his followers in academic and
military circles. 20
Paradoxically, the same traits that propelled him to success were also
the source of some trouble for him. Marshall was also described as arrogant,
argumentative, and stubborn; like many polarizing figures throughout history,
when meeting him one was either charmed or repulsed. The strong reactions
he elicited are best summarized in the vicious personal attacks aimed at him
by a former pupil and beneficiary of his patronage, David Hackworth.
In his critically acclaimed memoir About Face: The Odyssey of an
American Warrior, Hackworth is especially vitriolic towards Marshall,
accusing him of being a hustler, phony, and “less a military analyst than a
military ambulance chaser, more a voyeur than a warrior.” 21 This alone is not
terribly startling, and can even be expected given Marshall’s polarizing
personality. However as historian A. J. Bacevich points out in his review of
About Face, “Whether Marshall, in fact, was a “power-rapt little man who
threw his weight around shamelessly” matters not. That he may have been an
intellectual fraud, as Hackworth devastatingly maintains, matters a great deal

20

Smoler, “The Secret Of The Soldiers Who Didn’t Shoot,” 2.
David Hackworth and Julie Sherman, About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior (New
York: Simon & Shuster, 1989), 568-69.
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to those who turn to Marshall’s writings for insights into the behavior of
soldiers in battle.” 22
Was Marshall a self-promoting sensationalist who was only looking
for a story that had “juice”, as Hackworth claims? Perhaps, but no more than
his detractor and protégé in this case, Hackworth himself has been the target
of accusations that he also played fast and loose with figures and facts. 23
Regardless of his propensity to exaggerate or highlight the more exciting
elements of his military experiences through writing, Marshall was able to
identify and analyze a previously unidentified problem in the front lines,
drawing attention to issues that otherwise might have gone unnoticed. John
Keegan, eminent military historian at the Royal Military Academy at
Sandhurst, summarized Marshall’s contributions eloquently when he wrote:

Marshall's ultimate purpose in writing was not merely to describe and
analyze...but to persuade the American Army that it was fighting its
wars the wrong way...His arguments were consonantly effective, so
that he had the unusual experience for a historian of seeing his
message not merely accepted in his own lifetime but translated into
practice. 24
This was Marshall’s most enduring legacy. Though he thought otherwise
throughout the latter-half of his life, Marshall’s writings and theory on the

22

A. J. Bacevich, “Saving Face: Hackworth’s Troubling Odyssey,” Parameters (1989): 15.
Ibid.
24
John Keegan, “Battle and the Historian,” International Security (Winter 1978-79): 145.
23
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nature of man in combat challenged established doctrine and prompted
apparently corrective measures in training.
Having made a good reputation for himself through his publications,
the U.S. Army called upon him again for a data-gathering operation in Korea
from 1950 to 1951 as part of the Army’s Operations Research Office, and for
a second time in 1953 as a war correspondent attached to the 7th Infantry
Division. He collected numerous combat interviews through his AARs which
he analyzed and submitted to senior officials detailing proposals to increase
U.S. infantry and weapon effectiveness. 25 During this second visit to Korea,
he witnessed the infamous Battle of Pork Chop Hill, where Chinese
Communists threatened to overrun U.S. positions in an effort to test the
resolve of the United Nations while peace negotiations were taking place. 26
Later, Marshall published a book about the battle and sold the rights to
Hollywood for a 1959 film adaptation of the battle starring Gregory Peck, Rip
Torn, and George Peppard. His opinion about the future of warfare based on
his time in Korea cemented his view that new technology would not replace
conventional arms. He was hesitant to embrace the trend in military thinking
during the 1950s that increasingly argued that nuclear weaponry and advanced
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aviation technology would be a panacea for future wars. 27 In typical fashion,
Marshall went against the grain and vociferously asserted that the common
infantryman was still the deciding factor in any war.
Marshall officially retired from the Army Reserve in 1960 with the
rank of brigadier general, but was asked to serve as an un-official instructor in
Vietnam from 1966 to 1967. Charged with educating junior officers and noncommissioned officers in his AAR techniques, Marshall worked intimately
with Hackworth, who at the time, not surprisingly, wrote very fondly of
Marshall. Hackworth credited Marshall as co-author of his 2003 publication
The Vietnam Primer, a critique of counterinsurgency methods during the war.
In 1977 Marshall died at his home in El Paso, and was buried will full military
honors. He was survived by his third wife Catherine and four children.
Aside from participating in the four American wars, Marshall also
witnessed the Sinai War of 1956 after Israelis smuggled him into the country,
and later the Six-Day War of 1967. 28 He also observed the crisis in Lebanon
in 1958, the civil war in the Congo in 1961, and the unrest in Southwest
Africa in 1965. During his life Marshall had also maintained a thirty-year
correspondence with the brilliant British mechanized-war theorists Basil
Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller that began in the early 1930’s. Marshall spent
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time with iconic U.S. leaders such as Omar Bradley, General George C.
Marshall, George Patton, Dwight Eisenhower, F.D.R., and William
Westmoreland, all of whom had a favorable opinion of his efforts to improve
the U.S. military. 29
In his long career as a journalist, soldier, and military commentator,
Marshall wrote more than thirty books. He produced dozens of journal
articles, countless newspaper, radio, and television pieces and delivered
hundreds of speeches at civic-clubs, universities, war colleges, and on military
bases and around the world. Some of his more well-known works include The
Soldier's Load and The Mobility of a Nation (1950); The River and the
Gauntlet (1953); Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action,
Korea, Spring, 1953 (1956); and Night Drop: The American Airborne
Invasion of Normandy (1962). Ironically, when considering the prolific rate at
which Marshall published material, relatively little has been written about the
man himself. Marshall wrote an autobiography in 1979 titled Bringing up the
Rear, and countless personal tales exist from those who interacted with him;
yet his full story remains elusive, waiting for future scholars to paint a more
complete picture of his life. To date, historians Thomas F. Burdett, F.D.G.
Williams, and Roger Spiller have lead this effort—contributing immensely to
my own efforts in this work.
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Men Against Fire and the Ratio of Fire
The art of leading, in operations large or small, is the art of dealing with
humanity, of working diligently on behalf of men, of being sympathetic with
them, but equally, of insisting that they make a square facing toward their
own problems.
—S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire, 1947

Marshall’s 1947 publication, Men Against Fire deserves special
consideration, since it is central to the origin of killology and is therefore
essential to this thesis. Considered his most controversial work and arguably
one of his greatest contributions to military history, it generated the most
intense criticism of his research methods, leading many experts decry him as a
fraud in recent decades. But, for the academic and military community this
was a serendipitous event. As an unintended consequence of his polarizing
statements, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and
military scholars around the country began seriously assessing training
protocol with an eye towards reform. Created on July 1st, 1973 under General
William E. DePuy, who had worked closely with Marshall during World War
II and throughout his career, TRADOC is today the branch of the U.S. Army
concerned with developing new methods of training officers and enlisted men
for the future of warfare.
Contained within its pages is a detailed analysis of infantry tactics
used in World War II by the U.S. Army. Issues such as troop load-bearing
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capabilities, unit cohesion, terrain, and the problems a field commander is
likely to encounter are discussed based upon Marshall’s first-hand
experiences. He also sets a chapter aside to describe the likely nature of war in
the future, stating emphatically, “The final act will always be an act of the
battlefield, whether the ground forces which achieve it move by overland
transport or by sea or by air,” and, “Air power is essential to national survival.
But air power unsupported by the forces of the battlefield is a military means
without an end.” 30 This warning has repeatedly fallen on deaf ears in
Washington, despite Marshall’s admonition from many decades past. Finally,
throughout this book Marshall reasserts his opinion about the continuing
primacy of infantry in warfare, contrary to what some were predicting based
upon the rapidity of technological innovation.
The chapter titled, “Ratio of Fire” garnered the most excitement and
criticism due to the figures he presented within regarding combatant
participation of U.S. infantrymen in World War II. His conclusion shocked
senior officers and challenged the orthodoxy of existing training doctrines
when he claimed:

The proportions varied little from situation to situation. In an average
experienced infantry company in an average stern day's action, the
number engaging with any and all weapons was approximately 15 per
cent of total strength. In the most aggressive infantry companies, under
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the most intense local pressure, the figure rarely rose above 25 per cent
of total strength from the opening to the close of action. 31
At first, and perhaps inevitably, Marshall’s discovery was not well received.
Williams suggests the reason behind the initially poor reception of Marshall’s ratioof-fire concept was because “many misunderstood Marshall to be saying that the
American soldier was a coward.” 32 If examined as a singular argument, the
misinterpretation of what Marshall was proposing is understandable. But if examined
within the context of the greater work it is clear that Marshall is arguing a larger
point. What Marshall was also arguing is that on the battlefield, the most decisive
and critical point in any war, a small handful of men do the killing necessary for
victory. Reasons for why this is are varied. Some men may be carrying ammunition,
some are paralyzed with fear, and some are suppressed by enemy fire or trapped in
unfavorable terrain. Others, such as NCOs might be directing the shooting, medics
may be patching up wounded comrades, and yet others may be firing in the general
direction of the enemy without actually aiming their weapon or pretending to fire
altogether.
Not surprisingly, Marshall’s assertion raised serious questions and invited
scholars from various disciplines to evaluate his work in relation to their respective
fields. Psychologists were interested in the physiological impact of killing and why it
came more readily to some combatants over others. Sociologists and philosophers
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were interested in the socio-cultural implications of such an observation, what it
might mean about the human capacity for violence, and the role of society in
influencing such behavior. Most importantly, however, the military establishment
and military scientists were alarmed about the dangerous implication such a statistic
offered. If only a small fraction of front line troops actually fired their weapons at the
enemy with the intent to injure or kill, as Marshall claimed, then the U.S. military was
doing something terribly wrong when it came to preparing its troops for battle. Or
were they?
Much like the man who proposed the ratio of fire theory, it had a divisive
quality about it. Once the academic and military community had taken time to digest
his thesis, attack and praise were heaped on Marshall in fairly equal measure.
Initially, his findings filled a void in tactical military doctrine which he believed had
been overlooked. “But as I said in the beginning, it is an aspect of infantry combat
which goes unheeded. So far as the records show, the question has never been raised
by anyone: During engagement, what ratio of fire can be expected from a normal
body of well-trained infantry under average conditions of combat?”33 Though this is
not necessarily true, as we shall see in Chapter Two, Marshall was correct if his
statement is applied only to American records of fire-ratios. The militaries of
European countries had previously visited the subject, such as the Prussians and
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French, but their findings were from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and were
subsequently thought obsolete or of no real value.
The ratio-of-fire figure presented in Men Against Fire ultimately became the
hallmark of the book, and was the single most disputed fact ever penned by Marshall.
For example, in 1988, Professor Roger J. Spiller of the Combat Studies Institute in
Fort Leavenworth Kansas offered one of the better known critiques of Marshall’s
methodology and conclusions in an article published in the Royal United Services
Institute Journal entitled "S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire". Spiller’s article
says of Marshall:

That he had seen a great deal of soldiers going about their deadly work
was no empty boast, however. This mantle of experience, acquired in
several guises, protected him throughout his long and prolific career as
a military writer, and his aggressive style intimidated those who would
doubt his arguments. Perhaps inevitably, his readers would mistake his
certitude for authority. 34
More problematic are the charges levied against him by Spiller that his methodology
was flawed. The following conclusion is reached after working out the math
surrounding the number of units Marshall claims to have interviewed, the time he
claimed to have spent with each, and how long he was actually in the vicinity to
perform the AARs:

Opportunity aplenty existed in Europe: more than 1200 rifle
companies did their work between June 1944 and V-E day, 10 months
34
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later. But Marshall required by his own standard two and sometimes
three days with a company to examine one day's combat. By the most
generous calculation, Marshall would have finished "approximately"
400 interviews sometime in October or November 1946, or at about
the time he was writing Men Against Fire.
Marshall's own personal correspondence leaves no hint that he was
ever collecting statistics. His surviving field notebooks show no signs
of statistical compilations that would have been necessary to deduce a
ratio as precise as Marshall reported later in Men Against Fire. The
"systematic collection of data" that made Marshall's ratio of fire so
authoritative appears to have been an invention. 35

This is a harsh indictment indeed; Spiller accuses Marshall of intellectual
dishonesty, which is the death knell for any scholar. Why then should any
serious military historian, sociologist, or psychologist bother with Marshall’s
supposed works of fiction? Surprisingly, Spiller provides the best argument
himself in the same article:

The axiom upon which so much of his reputation has been built
overshadows his real contribution. Marshall's insistence that modern
warfare is best understood through the medium of those who actually
do the fighting stands as a challenge to the disembodied, mechanistic
approaches that all too often are the mainstay of military theorists and
historians alike. 36

Marshall’s contribution to the larger field of infantry tactics and combat psychology
created substantive improvements in infantry combat training. Men Against Fire was
so highly regarded for its combat analysis aside from the disputed ratio of fire, that
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the Israeli military had distributed the entire book among their armed forces in the
early 1950s. 37 Though a violation of copyright, this was a remarkable stamp of
approval; the Israelis were virtually fighting on all fronts against numerically superior
enemies using large numbers of citizen-soldiers. Marshall’s insight into the
psychological and tactical difficulties of delivering effective fire and of the problems
faced by command in battle was disseminated at all levels. Israel’s fighting men and
women referred to this work during some of their most difficult conflicts, perhaps the
indicator of its worth.
The same year that Spiller published his scathing assessment of Men Against
Fire, the highly-regarded Israeli combat psychologist Ben Shalit published The
Psychology of Conflict and Combat. In it, Shalit viewed Marshall’s work from a
psychological perspective, drawing upon the combat experiences of the Israeli
Defense Force for comparison. 38 Though Shalit also finds the ratio of fire
problematic, he acknowledges the overarching premise of the book that men in
combat must overcome psychological inhibitions against killing other humans. He
asserts that when soldiers overcome resistance to homicide, they are able to deliver
more effective fire support at critical moments in an engagement. 39
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Shalit claims specifically that in his experience “nearly 100 percent fired,
when told to do so or when circumstances demanded.” He continues, “my very
strong impression (as well as my own experience) is that firing is a very effective
method of relieving tension and fear, and is often engaged in even when there is no
need for it.” 40 This statement appears to refute Marshall’s claim, but while it is true
that the ratio of fire has, as a rule, increased, this was not unforeseen by Marshall.
Additionally, simply firing a weapon as therapy for jittery nerves as opposed to
aiming it at a human with an intent to kill, still fits within a larger narrative of
intrinsic human resistance to killing as proposed by Grossman and others.
By the time of his death, Marshall had amended his original ratio upward in
response to the new technological and tactical methods being employed in Korea and
Vietnam. In Korea, U.S. infantry platoons were increasingly issued larger numbers of
machine guns and other crew-manned weapons, significantly increasing their ratio of
fire. Marshall revised his estimate on the number of frontline combatants
participating in shooting at the enemy at around fifty percent. 41 Likewise, in Vietnam
the common grunt possessed more lethal fire capability in his M-16 than an entire
squad of Germans armed with bolt-action Mauser rifles possessed in World War II.
He also accurately understood that as the communication capability of field officers
and NCO’s expanded through the use of increasingly portable radio technology, the
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direct control necessary for increased rates of fire among infantrymen, would
improve. 42 He was convinced that corrective measures applied to combat training
techniques in the U.S. military would improve the volume of fire produced by U.S.
soldiers, and by extension lead to more tactical success. This has largely proven to be
true.
As a final thought on the debate about the accuracy of Marshall’s ratio of fire
theory and whether or not it is an indictment against all his work, Kelly C. Jordan
submits:

While surprising enough on their own, Marshall’s findings have
become even more controversial over the last decade, when other
veterans and scholars have investigated Marshall’s methodology and
found his figures based largely on unsubstantiated or nonexistent data.
Despite his flawed historical methods, Marshall was a keen observer
of human beings in battle, having watched soldiers fighting in at least
five different wars across the globe. His studies comprise, with few
exceptions, the entire body of work regarding the participation of
soldiers in combat. If for no other reason, this suggests that they
perhaps contain some information of value. 43
Why is this important? Based on the poignant questions raised about the
quality and usefulness of Men Against Fire, one can conclude that the truth about the
ratio of fire lies somewhere in the middle as is often the case with spectacular claims.
The previous examples are used to demonstrate both sides of the argument
surrounding the ratio of fire, and the heated discourse that continues today. That
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Marshall’s claim is incredibly contentious is critical to understanding the nature of the
arguments that surround the discipline of killology.
Marshall’s cardinal sin was that he provided little evidence to support his
ratio-of-fire figure. Instead, he probably used a combination of experience, intuition,
and imagination to arrive at a number sensational enough to warrant attention, yet
believable enough to pass inspection. 44 By the end of his time in Vietnam, his
estimate of the ratio of fire had grown to eighty percent, which only served to sharpen
his critic’s accusations of shoddy methodology. Marshall countered by arguing that
improved weapon technology, tactical training, and leadership techniques formed the
basis for the dramatic increase. It is also possible that Marshall’s new figures were
emblematic of his desire to mitigate criticism, and further bolster his claim that the
AAR procedure was leading to progress in the field. For this he was excoriated by
some members of academia and the military community who claimed that he was a
total fraud. However, regardless of the veracity of such claims, it is undoubtedly true
that he also moved the discussion of how people behave in combat into new arenas
and in new directions. He unwittingly bridged an interdisciplinary gap by bringing
elements of psychology, sociology, and military science together in an effort to
improve the tactics of the U.S. army.
Researching history over the years has revealed the occasionally
uncomfortable truth that regardless of an individual’s greatness or achievements—
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every man has feet of clay. Marshall was no exception. But it is also true that on
balance, Men Against Fire promoted Marshall’s belief that when all is said and done,
the man in the foxhole or in the trench is the one responsible for winning wars.
Military historian Russell W. Glenn echoes this thought when he wrote “In 1947,
nuclear weapons dominated the thinking of many United States military leaders.
Marshall recognized what so many failed to see: despite the unprecedented power of
these weapons, man is still the fundamental element in war.” 45 Clearly this is a
tribute to his basic grasp of the reality of war, something that he felt was beginning to
be forgotten by many policymakers caught up in the heady days of innovation and
scientific advances following World War II.
Technology can improve our methods of delivering death and carnage to
fellow humans, but without the lowly private to capitalize on this killing power, it is
of limited value. Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan have proven that technology alone
is not enough. Drones and high-altitude bombing have never, and likely never will,
replace the role of infantry in war. The newsman from Texas understood this during
a time when air power, armor, and nuclear technology were increasingly seen as the
defining weapons of future wars. Predictably, he went against the prevailing winds in
search of the real story, as was his custom.
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Chapter Two

Korea and Reform: Changing the Equation
They wrote in the old days that it is sweet and fitting to die for one's country.
But in modern war, there is nothing sweet nor fitting in your dying. You will die like a
dog for no good reason.

35

—Ernest Hemingway, Notes on the Next War, 1935

In 1942 the Red Army was in a desperate contest for survival against the
Wehrmacht. The Axis forces had penetrated deep into the Soviet Union since
Operation Barbarossa opened the war on the Eastern Front in June of 1941. During
the life-and-death struggle that characterized the slaughter in the east, desperate
measures were commonly employed by both sides. The Soviets, true to form, drew
upon all available resources in an effort to resist the German onslaught. Included
among the war material available was a legion of 50,000 dogs—a footnote generally
overlooked by historians writing about the war. 46
This omission is understandable given the degree of suffering and loss of life
around the world; the butcher’s bill for the Second World War is estimated at
between 50 and 60 million total dead, though some estimates are much lower. 47 Yet,
regardless of the total dead, there is a unique lesson to be learned through closer
scrutiny of the anti-tank dogs the Soviets employed against German armor. The
lesson was not about the merits of the hundeminen, or dog-mines; rather it was the
method by which their handlers trained them to carry out their macabre task that
intrigued both medical professionals and the U.S. military alike.
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Ivan Pavlov’s concept of conditional reflex, popularly known as classical
conditioning, was a key ingredient in the behavioral therapy applied to the Red Army
dogs. Pavlov who had received the 1904 Nobel Prize for his work, proved that
physiological responses to stimuli could be predicted, trained, and reinforced. The
most famous example of this process was the increased salivation by dogs when
presented with a stimulus previously associated with food, such as ringing a bell.
Armed with this basic understanding of psychological conditioning, Stalin’s dog
handlers buried food underneath stationary Soviet tanks before releasing half-starved
dogs collected from all throughout Russia to claim their prize. The dogs would then
belly-crawl under the tank’s front glacis in an effort to retrieve the reward. Ideally
during this activity a vertical lever jutting above the dog’s shoulders would trigger an
explosive package attached to the dog’s harness leading to a detonation that would
destroy or immobilize the tank. 48 This ambitious foray into weaponizing animals
through modern conditioning techniques was a spectacular failure.
The rudimentary explosive devices failed frequently enough that the ingenious
Soviet handlers decided to remotely detonate the mines strapped to the dog or use a
timer device just prior to attacking. Unfortunately for both the dogs and their
handlers, the rudimentary training did not account for various elements common to
the battlefield; stimuli that could not be overcome through conditioning, such as the
strange smells and sounds of German armor on the attack, sent the dogs fleeing back
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to their terrified masters with live explosives! Ultimately the program was scrapped
in favor of rescue and recovery training for the remaining Soviet dogs, which became
scarce as the Wehrmacht policy was to kill all dogs encountered in occupied territory
as a preventative measure. 49
The discovery of conditional reflex and the tenets associated with classical
conditioning created new avenues of research in behaviorism, but it was the
American B. F. Skinner and his work with pigeons and rats that built upon this
knowledge to develop new techniques for use in conditioning animals. In 1938
Skinner coined the term operant conditioning, building upon Edward Thorndike’s
Law of Effect which concerned learning in animals. 50 By introducing reinforcers
alongside operants already established in behaviorism such as punishment, Skinner
trained animals to predictably select the correct trigger to gain a reward. 51 Operant
conditioning for the purposes of this work can be generally understood as organisms,
including humans, moving through their environments rather haphazardly until they
encounter a reinforcing stimulus. The experience of that stimulus becomes associated
in memory with the behavior that immediately preceded it.
The medical community began searching for possible ways to apply this new
understanding about motivation and behavior hoping to unlock a successful formula
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for human psychological conditioning. Not surprisingly, a guaranteed method for
manipulating humans to the degree possible in the carefully regulated environment of
a laboratory was impossible. Nonetheless, the practical application of lessons
gleaned from advances in psychological-conditioning was of great interest to the U.S.
military.
The U.S. Army saw potential for enhanced training techniques using
Skinner’s formula. By the opening of hostilities in Korea in June of 1950 it had
begun tentatively integrating the latest psychological discoveries made during the
post-war period in an effort to address the alarmingly low ratio of fire Marshall
reported. Though it is inaccurate to say Marshall bears sole responsibility for the new
concepts applied to basic and field training, it is clear his after-action reviews and
alarmist tendencies got the proverbial ball rolling in the right direction. 52 The
momentum he created to find more effective means of training soldiers to kill,
acknowledged by the military establishment, was complemented by the work of
Pavlov, Thorndike, and Skinner.
Prior to Korea and Vietnam, combat training in the U.S. Army since its
formation in 1775 was largely concerned with practical military exercises and
managing and maintaining equipment. Repetition played an inordinate role in this
process, where recruits used rote memorization to complete the manual of arms,
marching, responding to the various drum cadences, and above all—following orders
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without question. This methodology was successful in terms of preparing ill-trained
farmers and shopkeepers for war; it was also successfully used in training the
conscripts and volunteers of the American Civil War. Grossman writes, “The concept
of drill had its roots in the harsh lessons of military success on battlefields dating
back to the Greek phalanx. Such drill was perfected by the Romans. Then, as firing
drill, it was turned into a science by Frederick the Great and then mass-produced by
Napoleon.” Prussia’s warrior-king Frederick II, or as he is more popularly known
Frederick the Great, conducted experiments designed to measure the shooting
accuracy and training of his army during the eighteenth century. What he discovered
was startling.
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In their work Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle, John Keegan and Richard
Holmes explain that “Old Fritz” ordered a one-hundred foot wide by six-foot tall
piece of canvass attached to wood uprights to roughly represent the size of an
opposing regiment of the line (200-1000 men). At 225 yards the Prussian regiment
armed with smoothbore muskets scored a hit rate of 25%. At 150 yards it increased to
40%, and at 75 yards 60% percent of the infantrymen found their mark. It would then
stand to reason, that a 200-man regiment firing at an opponent 75 yards away would
reduce their number by around 120 in the first volley. 54 However, when similar line
regiments fought in real battles, the number killed in the first volley was far less.
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Napoleonic and American Civil War expert and historian Paddy Griffith
estimated that on average only one or two men were struck down per minute during
the black-powder battles of the nineteenth century. This number is amazing
considering the Prussian hit rates of 60%. What’s more, the equipment of Napoleon’s
Grande Armée and that used by the Americans during the Civil War—was far
superior to that available to the Prussians of Frederick’s time. What was happening
was that the soldiers were either non-firers, or purposely missing. 55
Despite rigorous drilling and rote memorization of battle procedures, the
Prussians, Americans, and French were still failing to kill their opponents in numbers
equal to the capability of their equipment and training. That is not to say that the
soldiers were not butchering each other, rather, they were not butchering each other
as quickly as their commanders and the hard math predicted. There were certainly
instances of high casualties being inflicted in short order, but this was the exception
to the rule. More often the horrendous casualties associated with battles such as Cold
Harbor and Leipzig were the result of prolonged fighting which allowed casualties to
accumulate. The Battle of the Nations in 1813, for example, was a four-day event
which saw high casualties only after the assembled armies slugged it out for some
time. Other factors impacted the number of casualties, such as artillery and poor
leadership, but two regiments of the line in good order could be expected to inflict
only small numbers of casualties on each other under ordinary circumstances. 56
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Something was missing. How was it that up until the Korea War, technology
aside, the ratio of fire was so low? Why did the Prussians perform so well in target
practice, yet never came remotely close to replicating those hit percentages in battle?
What was lacking was a concrete way of dealing with the mental strain placed upon
soldiers in battle, and a means by which they could be taught to kill another human
more easily. Pavlov’s dogs and Skinner’s rats that provided some of the answers, or
rather the lessons gleaned from their experiments that created the foundation of
military conditioning. The psychological edge that breakthroughs in behaviorism
granted the U.S. military combined with rapid technological advances—changed the
killing equation. The application of psychological principles to the training regimen
of U.S. soldiers after World War II, restructuring of U.S. military units, and new
weapons of war resulted in an improved ratio-of-fire and less resistance to killing. 57

Korea
So our guns fired steadily all night, the barrels got red hot and we were
throwing water on them to try and cool them down. So we fired right through until
dawn, until the Chinese withdrew. The Chinese were bundling up their dead and
rolling them down the hill. They wrapped them in wire and rolled them down the hill
and took their wounded out.
—Francis Bayne, Canadian Artillery

Korea is a special case in the march towards understanding killology and how
the U.S. military began to overcome the resistance to killing inherent to most humans
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after Marshall exposed the problem. Called the “Forgotten War,” Korea is
exceptional because it is a transitional war in terms of emergent technology and
tactical reform. In the beginning, the Korean War was fought with antiquated
equipment, mostly 'leftover' items from World War II due to demobilization and size
reductions. By 1953 the weaponry available to the average U.S. combat regiment in
Korea was significantly improved over that of their World War II era counterparts.
The resulting increase in firepower capability contributed exponentially to increased
firing rates as reflected in AARs collected by Marshall and others. 58 The increased
availability of automatic and crew-served weapon systems is occasionally overlooked
by military historians in accounting for dramatic victories in Korea where a single
machine-gun emplacement often meant the difference between being overrun and
holding the line for another night. Instead, the less glamorous weaponry of the grunt
is overshadowed by flashy advances in aircraft technology which unarguably altered
the entire flow of the Korean War. Because the U.S. and United Nation air-forces
were able to achieve superiority in the skies over Korea, the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) was obliged to conduct operational and tactical military
operations at night for instance. 5960
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The technological transition to more automated weapon systems undoubtedly
contributed to increased fire-ratios, but so did the less well-known combat unit
reforms in the U.S. Army that occurred during the Korean War. Fortunately, by the
start of hostilities Marshall’s observations from World War II had sufficiently
influenced the upper echelons of the U.S. military to begin searching for a remedy to
the abysmally low ratio-of-fire while at the same time hurriedly restructuring obsolete
infantry brigades and companies to meet the challenges of a dynamic battlefield. 61
The response was that members of G-1 and G-3 consulted with field commanders
about how best to modernize line regiments, and by extension increase the percentage
of soldiers who actively fired their weapons with the intention to kill. However,
throughout 1950 and early 1951 the U.S. and their allies scrambled to replace service
units holding the line in Korea with better-trained combat troops from outside the
Korean Theater. Since the general drawdown after the surrender of Japan had been
largely completed, General Douglas MacArthur, overall commander of East Asian
operations was left a paltry force of four under-strength infantry divisions to work
with. 62
Marshall erroneously believed that a new training doctrine that integrated
minor conditioning tweaks, such as using human silhouette targets instead of a
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“bullseye” during basic training, could significantly overcome the non-firing instinct
displayed by soldiers during World War II. Instead, during the Korean War the
reorganization and rearming of U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) units from the
division down to the squad contributed the most to changing the fire ratio. 63 The
addition of artillery, recoilless-rifles, anti-tank systems, and especially machine guns
to battalions and platoons did more than the U.S. Army’s proto-conditioning
programs of the 1950s. 64 Not until the 1960s and Vietnam was operant conditioning
in basic training anywhere near the levels required to encourage killing among the
typical soldier. Evidence collected by Marshall himself suggested that the addition of
machine-gun teams and artillery companies to combat regiments between 1945 and
1953 was a significant advantage in altering the ratio-of-fire, despite clinging to the
belief that improved training techniques were an equally viable solution. When the
Korean War ended in July of 1953 the firing rate among U.S. soldiers increased to
55% according to Marshall’s estimates. 65
Technological Innovation
The first time I ever saw a jet, I shot it down.
—Chuck Yeager, USAF, describing his first confrontation with a Me262
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Technological innovation in warfighting had increased exponentially
throughout World War II and continued unabated through the end of Vietnam,
followed by a second explosion in military technological innovation during the
Information Age that is still ongoing. The breakthroughs in jet propulsion by the
Nazis in 1944 allowed them to field the Messerschmitt 262 Schwalbe (Storm Bird),
the world’s first operational fighter jet. Though the Me262’s were too few in number
and too late to enter the war to be decisive, the writing was on the wall. Jet-powered
aircraft were the future, and air superiority was critical.
As propeller-driven aircraft gave way to F-80 Shooting Stars and Soviet MiG15s, the war in the skies was forever changed. In 1950 the first recorded jet-to-jet kill
was scored by Lieutenant Russel J. Brown against a MiG-15 while piloting an F-80.
Indicative of the rate of technological change, the swept-wing design of the MiG-15
at the time of its downing had already made the straight-wing P-80 design obsolete;
meanwhile the USAF had already begun producing the swept-wing F-86 Sabre as a
counter.
However, jet fighters were not the only stars of the Korean sky. The Bell H13 helicopter, designated the “Sioux” by the U.S. Army, which began the ongoing
tradition of naming helicopters after Native American tribes, also made its grand
appearance and forever changed the nature of combined-arms warfare. As the first
large-scale helicopter procurement by the U.S. military, the H-13s were largely
limited to scouting and medical transport duty in Korea, though the full potential of
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the helicopter was not yet realized. The foundation for air-assault and mobile
operations like those of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) during the Vietnam War
were being laid.
On the ground, advances in vehicle and weapon design were not as drastic as
in the sky. Though some designs did stand out, such as the British Centurion Mk 3
tank, which proved exceptionally effective from its combat debut during the 1950
Pusan landing until the end of the war. The American M41 155mm howitzer motor
carriage provided unprecedented mobile artillery support and was so successful that
an updated variant designated the M44 was phased in at the end of the war. Many
other improvements to World War II era self-propelled guns, support weapons, and
mobility were made during the early 1950s, but their availability was the transitional
element most significant to increasing the ratio of fire in Korea.

Unit Reform
In the usual procedure, a flash fire was delivered with maximum power for three
minutes, the howitzers then cutting back from twelve to six rounds per tube per
minute while maintaining the fire six minutes. In the Arsenal-Erie action, the 48th
Field fired the maximum rate for four minutes, then suspended briefly.
—S. L.A. Marshall, Pork Chop Hill

The advances to weaponry and vehicles made during the Korean War were
impressive. It might be tempting to accept them as the major factor responsible for
the improved ratio-of-fire Marshall reported. Digging a bit deeper, however, reveals
that restructuring of U.S. Army and United States Marine Corps combat units
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probably played a larger role in the increased killing efficiency exhibited. All of the
firepower in the world is useless unless it can be brought to bear in an effective and
efficient manner.
Take for instance an incident recounted by Marshall in which concentrated
howitzer fire support, called “flash fire”, was used to effectively blunt a DPRK attack
on a U.S. position:
It was maintained for four minutes. Differing little from the curtain
barrage of World War I days, the "flash fire" of Korean operations was
an on-call, tightly sown artillery (plus 4.2 mortar) barrage, usually
horseshoe-shaped and so dropped that it would close around the front
and sides of an outpost ridge. The main idea of a flash fire was to
freeze enemy infantry movement, blocking out the enemy force on the
low ground while locking in such skirmishers as had gained the
heights. In effect, one battery fired on each concentration, 120 rounds
per minute, two shells breaking into the ground every second. High
explosive and proximity fuse shells were both used in this blast, the
balance varying according to terrain conditions. While a flash fire
lasted, infantrymen stayed in their fighting positions. 66

This tactical response to a dynamic situation was only possible because more artillery
had been attached to infantry and combat teams during the reforms of the late 1940s
and early 1950s.
Over sixty different United States artillery battalions served on the Korean
Peninsula. Regular Army, Marine Corps, and National Guard battalions all played a
role in the fighting. 67 The U.S. 8th Army, which had overall responsibility for the
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combat zone, wanted to have existing stocks of artillery divided among the three
corps under its jurisdiction. U.S. I, IX, and X Corps all received roughly equal
amounts of artillery support because of restructuring. By 1953 each of the six U.S.
divisions in Korea had been assigned four artillery battalions each, usually consisting
of three 105mm units for direct support of each regiment, and a 155mm unit for
heavier general divisional support. Outside of divisional battalions were the U.S.
Corps artillery battalions which were for general support of each corps front and had
enough mobility to relocate as the situation determined. In addition to increasing
artillery support for combat units, something which proved pivotal to their survival in
Korea, the U.S. Army began reorganizing the heart of its organization—the infantry.
In 1946 a conference was held at the Infantry School at Fort Benning Georgia
in an effort to assess the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. Army unit structure.
American combat infantry leaders reviewed tactics, doctrine, leadership, weapons,
personnel policies, training and organization at this conference. The conclusions and
recommendations reached at the Infantry School formed the basis for future U.S.
Army unit organization, equipment, and general doctrines well into the 1950s. 68 The
increased ratio-of-fire that Marshall observed in Korea was the result of restructuring
infantry units, especially the smallest organizational elements. 69 At the platoon and
squad level changes to size and composition occurred, namely the reduction in size of
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the combat infantry squad from twelve to nine members. This was felt to be a size
more easily commanded and maneuvered. Though at face value this appears to be a
disadvantage, the strength of reduced-size platoons and squads was offset by
increased numbers of machine guns and other support weapons. Whereas in World
War II a rifle platoon had a single Browning Automatic Rifle assigned to it, towards
the middle and latter stages of the Korean War an infantry squad was assigned at least
one, sometimes two. Furthermore, at the platoon level, a reformed unit had an
effective strength of thirty-six men with five crew-served weapons as opposed to only
three in World War II.
Arguably the greatest change to the Table of Organization and Equipment
(TOE) by the U.S. Army when examining combat infantry performance was the
addition of crew-served weapons at the platoon level. Generally speaking, during
World War II the heavier machine-guns, mortars, and anti-vehicle weapon platforms
were assigned to regiments and companies which in turn distributed them to their
platoons as needed. In Korea, individual platoons were assigned crew-served
weapons directly. In practice this meant that a smaller combat team could lay down
an inordinate amount of firepower, not reliant on whatever was available at the
company level. U.S. infantry tactics also evolved to incorporate these changes by
adopting some doctrine from the Wehrmacht’s playbook. Specifically, squads would
be organized around the light machine gun much like the Germans with their superb
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MG 34s in World War II. 70 Small unit tactics going forward emphasized the light
machine gun as the squad’s most important piece of weaponry. Marshall reiterated
the importance of the BAR to a squad’s performance in his official submission of
observations in Korea. Entitled, “Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons
Usage in Korea, Winter 1950-51,” where he states:
In infantry operations in Korea, it is conspicuous that rifle fire
builds up strongly around the BAR. It is therefore reasonable to
believe that an increase in ratio of BARs to rifles would stimulate
stronger fire within the squad unit. In every engagement there are
pivotal influences—fire builds up because one man is doing a
particular thing with his weapons and others move to support him.
BAR action is most frequently the moving force because of the high
mobility of the weapon and its solid fire effects. 71
During the long nights in Korea, an operational .30 or .50 caliber heavy
machine gun often meant the difference between seeing the morning and being
overrun. Numerous first-hand accounts of Korean veterans extolling the importance
of keeping the machine guns firing exist. Take, for example, Sergeant Earnest Baker
Jr. who served in the 7th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Infantry Division. His firsthand
experience was that the antiquated quad-.50 caliber heavy machine gun he manned
was crucial to supporting defensive and offensive operations. He explained that it
was mounted to a half-track that was often stationary in a hull-down posture, ready to
throw serious amounts of lead into onrushing human wave attacks by the Chinese and
North Koreans. He says:
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It's an old World War II vehicle, and you would dig it in. And then you
had -- this gun would fire, and this gun would fire, and this gun would
fire, and this gun would fire. They would crossfire, and every fifth
round was a tracer. And if you wanted to light up a hillside, you just
fired into the hills and set it on fire, and you could tell where they was
at. You could get a good location of where they was at. 72

When asking if he was involved in defending against human wave attacks employed
by the enemy Baker says: “Indirectly, I was. I was -- You know, we would fire
weapons and everything, our machine guns and everything, just for our support. But,
you know, as far as hand-to-hand or something like that, no, I wasn't.” Finally, Baker
answers questions regarding what exactly they fired at with their support weapons,
whether they went for mass-ground coverage or individual targets:
Well, at times it would be massive ground, and other times you'd have
individuals. The same way with the tanks, you know, you had an
individual target, or we would just follow ahead or behind giving
support. They would just come by -- thousands of them, you know,
and it was like a herd of cattle, and they would overrun your hill. You
would be back here, and they would be up -- I mean, you know, they
just went like something wild. 73

Bakers’ statements illustrate the important role machine-guns and heavy
support weapons played in resisting waves of enemy combatants, similar to
the fighting in France during WWI. However, the Chinese and DPRK faced
much more powerful weapons than could be found in the trenches of WWI,
while still using archaic infantry tactics. The end result was exceedingly high
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casualties for the DPRK and Chinese. The Americans and their U.N. allies
suffered mightily too, but the post-war reforms mitigated the losses they
would have suffered without the addition of artillery and crew-served
weapons to most combat units.

The Psychology Behind It
It seems strange . . . that a company of men can fire volley after volley at a like
number of men at not over a distance of fifteen steps and not cause a single casualty.
Yet such was the facts in this instance.
—Benjamin McIntyre, Vicksburg 1863

For the study of killology, Korea was a transitional war. Marshall’s findings
influenced the U.S. Army enough to begin moving towards a more scientific
approach to combat training with the goal of increasing fighting performance.
Though this shift would not become fully evident until the Vietnam War, the
conditions necessary for fundamental changes in U.S. training doctrine were in place.
The U.S. military was becoming a modern organization, receptive to discoveries
made in scientific and academic fields—especially psychology. Intangible
psychological factors combined with unit reform most influenced the increase of
firing rates in Korea. What then, does the founder of killology believe are the
specific factors that increased the ratio-of-fire in Korea? The answer is found by
examining the merger of psychology, sociology, and weaponry.
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Experience has shown that when soldiers operate a crew-served weapon, they
are more likely to participate in battle. By increasing the number of crew-served
weapons in numerically smaller platoons and squads, the ratio of those participating
in battle increased, which in turn increased the ratio-of-fire. Grossman argues that
fear of letting one’s comrades down, and consequently being shunned from the ingroup, encouraged soldiers to fight; therefore, having soldiers organized around
operating crew-served weapons fostered an environment that promoted engagement.
Jordan supports this assertion by writing, “These changes gave these units additional
machine guns, whose operators appeared to fire in almost every engagement;
significantly increased the proportion of crew-served weapons to riflemen; and
allowed these units to tap into powerful small-unit sociological forces by
transforming the squad into a more effective “primary group.” 74
The increased availability of crew-served weapons meant that squad-sized
units became more cohesive both mentally and physically. Physical proximity to
fellow soldiers is also a decisive factor in promoting combat participation. When
individual riflemen are isolated they tend not to engage as often or with as much
vigor as they might when under the watchful eye of their comrades. 75 For example, a
typical machine gun crew might require anywhere between two and four men, which
in a squad of nine was a significant portion. Because the firepower of the machinegun was instrumental to survival in Korea its continuing operation during a battle was
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a priority in most cases. This system insured that the gun crew was in immediate
physical proximity to one another, while the remaining rifleman would disperse in
relation to its position. By keeping the squad within generally close proximity,
authority could be more easily established by commanders, while at the same time the
influence of peer pressure and mutual surveillance was applied.
Second to the increased rates of fire due to the addition of crew-served
weapons, artillery played a crucial role in Korea. Artillery is unique on the battlefield
since it allows widespread killing without the emotional strain associated with other
combat branches; the closest similarity to any branch of the armed services would be
to that of bomber aircraft. In both cases, the physical proximity from the target
removes the individual from the turmoil caused by the inner resistance to killing. The
bombardier and the 155mm howitzer crew both are absolved from seeing the product
of their handiwork, unlike their comrades in the infantry. In their minds, the enemy
was nothing more than grids on a map, and when viewed in such a manner, it is easy
to kill alarmingly large numbers of people without adverse psychological trauma.
Napoleon understood this and made sure he had more artillery than his opponents
whenever possible. He realized that they did the preponderance of killing in battle,
especially when loaded with grapeshot. 76
Further illustrating this point is the experience of John Phillips, an
artilleryman with the 780th Field Artillery Battalion attached to X Corps in Korea. He
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described the terrible killing capability of artillery, detailing the use of air-burst timed
shells for maximum anti-personnel effect:
We had eight-inch guns. The shells had a bursting radius of 450 yards,
and we often shot various kinds of shells. But for people we'd always
shoot shell VT which was a variable time. It would go off when it hit
the ground if it didn't go off 60 yards, 60 feet above their head. So we
had personnel. We'd try to shoot, shoot VT, the fuse VT so that it
would go off. And with a 450-yard bursting radius from above, think
of all the people you could injure. 77

Phillips clearly realized he had killed many of the enemy during his time with the
780th. However from his battery’s position three miles behind the front-line, he was
emotionally and psychologically insulated from trauma. Phillips continued
explaining the carnage he had wrought on the DPRK through indirect fire:
But anyhow, this runner came back with the information, and we shot.
And we shot quite a few shells in there. Major Munzell let us shoot a
lot of ammo up that night, and we blanketed that, that whole valley
and everything where they were coming through. When it was over the
next morning, they went in, and the South Koreans said that there were
still 300 dead laying on the ground, and there was a Russian military
officer with them in full dress uniform. We, we got them that night,
but, but we didn't just kill 300. You see, when the North Koreans lose
dead, they went out there and picked up everybody they could find and
carry them away so we never knew how many we killed. 78
The scene in the valley the following morning must have been horrific, but as Phillips
said himself—the ROK troops reported the casualties to him. He never had to see the
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product of his handiwork, and therefore was free to kill, only abstractly aware of the
carnage.
As a corollary to the fact that artillery caused the most enemy casualties
during the Korean War, the difference between indirect fire and direct fire is worth
examining. 79 Artillerymen were successful at avoiding the emotional cost of killing
and war in general because they did not kill anyone directly, and no one was
specifically trying to kill them. As Dyer points out:
There has never been a similar problem with getting artillerymen or
bomber crews or naval personnel to kill. Partly it is the same pressure
that keeps machine-gun crews—they are being observed by their
fellows—but even more important is the intervention of distance and
machinery between them and the enemy; they can simply pretend they
are not killing human beings. 80
But, as the Prussians had learned centuries earlier, killing your opponent at close to
mid-range was an entirely different prospect. Using direct fire at these ranges, while
the screams and cries of the enemy are clearly heard, and the indescribable images
clearly seen, adding to potential mental trauma.
Despite this, the direct fire of the machine guns contributed significantly to
enemy casualties in Korea. Though not as efficient as a well-placed artillery
bombardment the gun crews swept the field with fully-automatic fire, sometime
simply aiming at nothing more than shadowy figures at night. Lee Young Ho of 3rd
Battalion, ROK Marine Corps described a night attack like this:
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Under constant flares I could clearly see unfolding a human wave of
Chinese soldiers approaching our lines. “You bitches!” I cursed them
unconsciously and pulled my heavy machine gun’s trigger. The area
was nothing short of pure hell. All sorts of weapons were discharging
their deadly bullets and shells at hellish rates. 81
This further reinforces Dyer’s and Grossman’s argument that distance and plausible
deniability were helpful in overcoming the negative aspects associated with killing.
Ho had no idea which of his rounds found their target or even what he was
specifically firing at besides the “human wave” before him. Regardless, Ho dutifully
carried out his job, operating his machine gun until he was knocked unconscious by a
grenade blast.
The Korean War unveiled new technology and new insight into the nature of
killing and how best to exploit it. Jet aircraft and helicopters were on the verge of
irrevocably changing warfare, though it would be another decade before their true
combat potential was realized in the skies and on the battlefields of Vietnam. As in
World War II before, during the Korean War airpower was an essential element of
victory both tactically and strategically. U.S. and U.N. control of the skies created
significant advantages, namely forcing the enemy to operate under the cloak of
darkness, always wary of the jets and bombers overhead. But, it was also still true
that like World War II, the infantryman was the one who, at the end of the day, got
the job done. Air power has limitations that only the grunt and his weapon could
solve.
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Marshall’s alarmism resulted in a serious effort to restructure the U.S. Army
for future conflicts. His observations informed those responsible for the restructuring
initiative in 1946 that by 1953 had ultimately created a force resembling the modern
combat organization system that emphasizes regimental combat teams (RCT), and
fire-support elements. By adding artillery, machine guns, and anti-tank weaponry to
the TOE, the average soldier was empowered by the responsibility that came with
operating or supporting the team’s efforts. The support weapons became a rally point
of sorts—the piece of equipment that had to be kept firing at all costs.
The mechanized nature of killing with machine guns helped overcome
resistance to killing, though it would be disingenuous to claim it was a panacea to
non-firing. In order to further understand killology, and how it is being utilized
today, we must examine the changes to training and psychological conditioning that
occurred after Korea and through the 1960s. More specifically, operant conditioning
would begin to play a larger role in combat readiness and the capacity of U.S. soldiers
to kill the enemy. This will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters.
The unit reforms during and preceding the Korean War necessarily lead to
increased firing rates and enemy casualties as squads, platoons, and companies had
more access to crew-served weapons. The tactical lessons learned in Korea were
scrutinized heavily by all levels of the U.S. military and across all branches. The
conclusion they reached was that sociological group dynamics and the availability of
crew-served weapons were essential to increased fighting performance. This trend
continued until the Vietnam War when the M-60 light machine-gun became
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indispensable to infantry platoons; additionally the infantry serving in Vietnam were
armed with fully automatic M-16 rifles capable of firing 700 rounds per minute. This
technological advance in small arms along with new training doctrines organized
around psychological conditioning led to the 90% ratio-of-fire reported by Marshall
and others observing combat soldiers in Vietnam.
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Chapter Three

Vietnam: Perfecting the Math

We seem bent upon saving the Vietnamese from Ho Chi Minh, even if we have to kill
them and demolish their country to do it. I do not intend to remain silent in the face of
what I regard as a policy of madness which, sooner or later, will envelop my son and
American youth by the millions for years to come.

—Senator George McGovern on the Senate floor on April 25, 1967

“Do you remember the first time you killed someone?” The interviewer with
the United States Department of Veterans Affairs asked Lonnie, a balding man with
glasses in his sixties and a Vietnam War combat veteran with deep lines etched into
his face. Lonnie, with a wistful look simply answered “Yeah,” his head bobbing in
agreement, seemingly to reassure himself of his participation in this act of violence.
Visibly disturbed by the recollection of these events Lonnie continues, “I was the
only one up there that wasn’t hurt and scared to death.” Emphatically he repeats
“scared to death” several more times while staring off-camera. “Somebody get up
here and help me! I’m alone!” Lonnie recalls his paralyzing fear, “and then, two
little heads…I was down and all I could see was his head and shoulders…he had a
hardhat on, and then I saw the red emblem.” Lonnie, his hands now gesticulating
wildly, begins recounting the painful event “and then, when his, when I could see a
silhouette” Lonnie freezes and stares vacantly as the interview room falls deafeningly
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silent. “I blasted ‘em. Silhouettes. They’re not real people, there are just targets!” he
blurts out. The interviewer waits for Lonnie to regain his composure and follows up
with “Is that how you kinda saw it? Would you try to disconnect them as people?”
Lonnie calmly replies, “That was what we were taught to do…those weren’t people,
those are silhouettes.”
Daniel, also a Vietnam combat veteran, agreed to be interviewed as part of the
same project and further illustrates the impact of killing in wartime. Like Lonnie,
Daniel was also significantly impacted by his experiences during the fighting in
Vietnam. Daniel tells the interviewer a story about a young Vietnamese soldier who
was mortally maimed by the directed blast of a claymore mine. Though Daniel
struggles through his tale he makes it a point to mention that “It was strange you
know, you could disassociate when you’re shooting at spots in the jungle, but this guy
was right there, and I felt very compassionate and I was thinking about his girlfriend,
his family, whatever. And it was a moment I went through that I think it affected me
a lot.” Seemingly to convince himself as much as the interviewer, he continues, “I
didn’t feel any personal guilt, I felt sorry for him. My mind at the time was don’t let
it bother you, don’t think about it, just do it.”82
The U.S. combat troops arriving in South Vietnam in March of 1965 were the
inheritors of advances made in combat training. As such, the ratio of fire during the
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Vietnam War for U.S. combatants was around 80-90%. 83 Marshall wrote an analysis
of the changing ratio of fire during Vietnam and concluded:
According to the data basis, the U.S. infantry line in Vietnam requires
no stimulation whatever to its employment of organic weapons when
engaged. The fire rate among patrols in heavy, if brief, contact is not
infrequently 100 percent. Within the rifle company, during
engagement prolonged for several hours, the rate will run 80 percent or
more and the only nonfirers will be the rearward administrative
element or the more critical cases among the early wounded. It is not
unusual for one man to engage with three or more weapons during the
course of a two-hour fight. 84

These results were the culmination of a process that began with Marshall’s alarmism
at the poor firing rates he observed in World War II, followed by subsequent reforms
to the tactical composition of combat units and their tables of equipment in Korea.
The reorganization of combat units around crew-served weapons, combined with
increased availability of ranged killing power through artillery and air support, began
moving the ratio in the desired direction. By the start of the ground war in Vietnam
military, psychologists and TRADOC had managed to tap into primal psychological
and sociological forces—fundamentally altering the capacity of U.S. combatants to
kill. 85 The American soldiers in Vietnam were the most psychologically conditioned
troops in the history of the United States armed forces; they had access to weapons
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and training that allowed them to overcome their inherent resistance to killing, though
perhaps not the necessary safeguards to prevent psychological trauma associated with
combat. 86 The equation for killing was close to solved, it seemed, but at what cost?

The True Cost

You will kill ten of us, we will kill one of you, but in the end, you will tire of it
first.
—Ho Chi Minh, September 1946, during negotiations with the French

At the strategic and operational level, the Vietnam War cost the United States
and its allies a tremendous amount of blood and treasure. Roughly 60,000 Americans
were killed in action (KIA) between 1964 and the fall of Saigon in April of 1975,
with formal ground operations beginning in 1965 and ending by 1973. 87 In terms of
participation, over half a million personnel were in country during the peak of U.S.
involvement in 1969, and approximately three million service men and women would
eventually serve in Vietnam and southeast Asia throughout the conflict. 88 The Army
of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) suffered around 250,000 recorded deaths
between 1960 and 1974, though more recent estimates put the number closer to
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300,000 deaths. 89 Under U.S. guidance and support, ARVN forces swelled to over
one million. The economic cost of the war to the U.S. according to the Department of
Defense was $173 billion (over a trillion in 2016 dollars), not including costs
associated with veteran’s benefits and interest accrued. 90
As North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh had predicted, the North
Vietnamese Army (NVA) and their Viet Cong allies in the South paid a terrible price
in the number of lives lost, but the lives were not sacrificed in vain. By outlasting the
U.S. and South Vietnamese both militarily and politically, ultimately the North
Vietnamese dual strategic war aims of unification and independence became a reality.
As of 1995, the Vietnamese government officially claims over one million NVA and
Viet Cong were KIA, with some estimates as high as 1.7 million casualties. The U.S.
Department of Defense estimated 950,000 communist combatants were KIA,
seemingly in line with the general consensus of historians and military experts. 91
Beyond the horrifying combat casualties during the period of U.S.
involvement, likely the civilian population suffered even more. In 1995 the
Vietnamese government released an official report stating that 2 million civilians had
been killed. 92 Though incomplete, the government report was further bolstered by a
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2008 Harvard study that lends credence to the number reported. 93 Regardless of the
exact number of civilians killed or injured, it is clear that the nature of war during
Vietnam allowed for indiscriminate slaughter both from the air, as indicated by the
65,000 North Vietnamese civilians killed by air strikes, and on the ground, as
demonstrated at the infamous My Lai massacre. Ironically, though experts estimated
that Vietnam is the most bombed country in history, the lion’s share of the bombs
landed in South Vietnam. 94 Brian Wilson, a captain in the Air Force, recalls an
instance of bomb-damage assessment in the Mekong Delta in which "It was the
epitome of immorality...One of the times I counted bodies after an air strike—which
always ended with two napalm bombs which would just fry everything that was
left—I counted sixty-two bodies. In my report I described them as so many women
between fifteen and twenty-five and so many children—usually in their mothers' arms
or very close to them—and so many old people." 95 Airstrikes accounted for the
majority of civilian casualties, though how many exactly may never be known.
Although this chapter specifically examines killing from the perspective of the
soldier, the efficacy of airpower and artillery in Vietnam remained undiminished
since the Korean War, if for no other reason than increased tonnage of munitions
used. Indeed, the U.S. military by 1965 had incorporated artillery batteries into most
combat formations, and used a fire base system that allowed artillery coverage of U.S.
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and ARVN operations. 96 The preponderance of killing during Vietnam was still
done through bombs, artillery, and crew-serviced weapons—which now included the
excellent belt-fed M60 light machine gun which had proved itself repeatedly in
battle. 97 Also, the capacity to kill that comes from having greater physical proximity
to the enemy was still incredibly important, though ground troops in the particularly
harsh terrain of Vietnam on occasion would shed their heavier crew-serviced
weapons such as the 107mm and 81mm mortars in exchange for mobility, or adjust
fire support tactics as needed. 98 The helicopter also came into its own during the
Vietnam War, and by virtue of mobility, altered the nature of modern warfare
irrevocably. The ability to bring large volumes of firepower to a fight quickly, or
deliver fresh troops while removing the wounded from a hot landing zone, was of
inestimable value. 99 Helicopters became integral to the day-to-day operations of U.S.
and allied forces in Vietnam while also adding a complex vertical dimension to
combat operations which is being further refined today above proving grounds such
as Iraq and Afghanistan. 100 Finally, it is worth noting that the number of rounds
expended by an infantryman from an M-16 for one enemy killed in Vietnam was
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approximately 50,000. 101 This volume of fire per enemy KIA should not be
surprising given the large number of combat troops that were engaging the enemy, the
capacity for high rates of fire from U.S. small arms, the nature of the terrain, and an
urgency to engage quickly before the enemy could disengage. Clearly, however, U.S.
troops were using their weapons to the utmost, and had no compunction about
expending copious amounts of ammunition, even if only for fire suppression.
The considerable cost in lives and money associated with the U.S.
involvement in Vietnam is inescapable, yet there is another cost less often discussed
in military analysis of the war’s outcome—the emotional and psychological toll. The
psychological damage suffered by tens of thousands of U.S. veterans is a very real
cost that is harder to quantify, and for that reason less is often detailed in publications
about the war. 102 This was especially true during the war, when high morale was
paramount and propaganda was liberally applied throughout training. 103 Despite a
general avoidance of the topic in technical and theoretical military courses during the
conflict and in the decades that followed, the psychological damage to U.S.
combatants in Vietnam was directly related to the startling kill rates achieved by the
same men. 104
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In his book Kill Anything that Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam,
Nick Turse discusses the degree to which U.S. troops willingly committed atrocities
in an effort to produce results for their commanders, who in turn were urged on by the
Pentagon. 105 Due to the nature of the fighting, and under immense psychological
strain, U.S. and allied forces committed atrocities against civilians with seemingly no
constraint in some instances. 106 Though the My Lai massacre is the most well-known
instance of organized murder, many other massacres of varying size occurred during
the period of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. It is far beyond the scope of this thesis to
mention every incident, however the key point to understand is that the psychological
inhibitions U.S. soldiers had prior to Vietnam, such as simply firing their weapon,
were no longer in place. 107 It appears that quite the opposite was the case, since not
only did U.S. soldiers in combat fire their weapons more frequently, they were also
more commonly involved in ruthless pacification exercises that frequently resulted in
killing. The U.S. military determined that enemy body counts would be the standard
metric by which to determine an operation’s success. 108 This mentality ultimately
resulted in a bloodthirsty attitude by field commanders and their subordinates to
increase the “elimination ratio”. 109
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Emblematic of the desire for a high body count, Operation Speedy Express is
a clear example of the indiscriminate killing of civilians and enemy combatants in an
effort to get results. The 9th Infantry Division under command of General Julian
Ewell, with the full support of Washington, would lead the operation that was slated
to begin in December of 1968 and last until May 1969. Speedy Express was centered
in the densely populated Mekong Delta and was particularly active in the provinces of
Kien Hoa and Dinh Tuong. 110 Hackworth describes Ewell as easily angered,
demanding, and forever looking to “jack up the body count” according to David
Hackworth, then a battalion commander. 111 Operations by the 9th Infantry Division
under Ewell resulted in extraordinary elimination ratios that were proudly displayed
in a tactical analysis titled Sharpening the Combat Edge: The Use of Analysis to
Reinforce Military Judgement, written by Ewell and co-authored by his then chief of
staff Ira Hunt. It states that just before Speedy Express began the kill ratio for the 9th
Infantry was 14:1. By the end of first month after operations began, the ratio was up
to 24:1, and later escalated to a mind boggling 134:1 in April. 112 Turse emphatically
states, “Just as Ewell wanted, Vietnamese were dying all over the Delta. They just
weren’t, in many cases, enemy troops.” 113 To further illustrate the operational
situation on the ground, John Paul Vann, the third highest-ranking American in
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Vietnam, succinctly summarized operations by IV Corps in the Mekong Delta as
“many My Lais.” 114
The brutality of the fighting on the ground in operations such as Speedy
Express and others around South Vietnam was proof enough that psychological
restraints had been lifted in many instances, and the ratio of fire, operant
conditioning, and a few other significant factors were at play. 115 This development
further strengthened the argument that psychology could be used in conjunction with
better technology and training to produce an efficient killing machine out of the
average infantryman. 116 Yet, many first-hand accounts by Vietnam combat veterans,
indicate that those who had killed other humans were still impacted by the ordeal
despite the psychological conditioning they received which allowed them to kill in the
first place. To outline this point, consider Grossman’s analysis of what was
happening:
In Vietnam the nonfiring rate was close to 5 percent. The ability to
increase this firing rate though, comes with a hidden cost. Severe
psychological trauma becomes a distinct possibility when
psychological safeguards of such magnitude are overridden.
Psychological conditioning was applied en masse to a body of soldiers,
who, in previous wars, were shown to be unwilling or unable to
engage in killing activities. When these soldiers, already inwardly
shaken by their inner killing experiences, returned to be condemned
and attacked by their own nation, the result was often further
psychological trauma and long-term psychic damage. 117
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In fact, the percentage of U.S. service personnel who suffered negative
psychological consequences associated with participation in combat, such as Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), is at one in three according to the most recent
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs study. 118 When adding significant substance
abuse, anxiety, and severe depression, the percentage rises yet further. Interestingly,
though not surprising, those veterans who had participated in more frontline combat
were disproportionately represented as having significant readjustment issues. 119 Why
were American combat troops not only achieving a high ratio-of-fire, but also
seemingly more capable of killing and committing acts of cruelty towards both
civilians and enemy alike? What had changed in the production of a combat
infantryman during Vietnam?
The Program

It's easier if you catch them young. You can train older men to be soldiers; it's done
in every major war. But you can never get them to believe that they like it, which is
the major reason armies try to get their recruits before they are twenty. There are
other reasons too, of course, like the physical fitness, lack of dependents, and
economic dispensability of teenagers, that make armies prefer them, but the most
important qualities teenagers bring to basic training are enthusiasm and naivete. . .
.The armed forces of every country can take almost any young male civilian and turn
him into a soldier with all the right reflexes and attitudes in only a few weeks. Their
118
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recruits usually have no more than twenty years' experience of the world, most of it as
children, while the armies have had all of history to practice and perfect their
technique.

— Gwynne Dyer, War

To understand why U.S. combat soldiers in Vietnam had such a high ratio of
fire, as well as why in many instances killing was “easier” for them compared to their
World War II counterparts, an examination of three core psychological concepts is
necessary. Using these three principles during training was the crucial difference
psychologically between Korea and Vietnam in terms of the capacity of an average
recruit to kill another human, and in some cases even take pleasure in the act. 120
Specifically, the methods used to ensure this result are desensitization, conditioning,
and denial defense mechanisms. 121 Grossman believes this triad is the deciding
psychological factor in enhancing combat performance. 122 He explains:
And thus, since World War II, a new era has quietly dawned in
modern warfare: an era of psychological warfare–psychological
warfare conducted not upon the enemy, but on one’s own troops.
Propaganda and various other crude forms of psychological enabling
have always been present in warfare, but in the second half of this
century psychology has had an impact as great as that of technology on
the modern battlefield. 123
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What is the purpose and impact of these methods the founder of killology has placed
such importance on? A general overview is adequate for each of the three concepts
as they relate to killology, and specifically Vietnam. However, much more can be
said about the role each method plays in preparing recruits for battle.
Desensitization during military training is not a new phenomenon. Humans
have always used mechanisms to define their enemies as different. For instance,
primitive tribes have frequently taken names that when translated mean “man” or
“human”, by definition making non-members less than human or “others.” 124
Another obvious example is the names U.S. combatants have used for their enemies
over the decades: Huns, Krauts, Japs, gooks, slopes, dinks, Commies, and so on. 125
Dyer bolsters this assertion by writing:
Most of the language used in Parris Island to describe the joys of
killing people is bloodthirsty but meaningless hyperbole, and the
recruits realize that even as they enjoy it. Nevertheless, it does help to
desensitize them to the suffering of an “enemy,” and at the same time
they are being indoctrinated in the most explicit fashion (as previous
generations were not) with the notion that their purpose is not just to
be brave or to fight well; it is to kill people. 126

Authors such as Dyer, Grossman, and Holmes have studied the celebration of killing
in training, and have largely determined that bloodthirsty rhetoric aimed at
desensitizing recruits was virtually unheard of in World War I, rare during World
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War II, more prevalent by Korea, and pervasive in Vietnam. 127 This was especially
useful in overcoming the social-cultural indoctrination the average U.S. recruit may
have regarding the morality of killing. 128
Turse provides a further example of the desensitization process in action when
he describes the prevailing sentiment of high-ranking commanders to enlisted men
concerning the Vietnamese people:
The notion that Vietnam’s inhabitants were something less than human
was often spoken of as the “mere-gook-rule,” or, in the acronym-mad
military, the MGR. This held that all Vietnamese—northern and
southern, adults and children, armed enemy and innocent civilian—
were little more than animals, who could be abused or killed at will.
The MGR enabled soldiers to abuse children for amusement; it
allowed officers sitting in judgement at courts-martial to let off
murderers with little or no punishment; and it paved the way for
commanders to willfully ignore rampant abuses by their troops while
racking up “kills” to win favor at the Pentagon. 129

The emotional distance created by labelling the enemy as part of the outside-group
made maiming or killing them easier. This dehumanization of the enemy is
instrumental in not simply training soldiers to be brave, but to also be effective
killers.
In most cases the desensitization process during Vietnam was applied early in
a young recruit’s career as a soldier. They are told that killing the enemy is
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appropriate and good, and that the enemy is not fully human. Often training videos
and lectures are full of gory-details that celebrate the mutilation of the enemies
through claymores or headshots, while the drill instructors praise them for honing
their aggression. 130 Through the use of psychological techniques with varying
degrees of intensity during training, recruits can be desensitized sufficiently that
inherent resistance to killing is largely overcome. As Dyer notes, “In basic training
establishments, however, the malleability is all one way: in the direction of
submission to military authority and the internalization of military values. What a
place like Parris Island produces when it is successful, as it usually is, is a soldier who
will kill because that is his job.” 131
To civilians and military personnel, conditioning is perhaps the most wellknown concept in the triad. During the Vietnam War, psychological conditioning
was a staple of basic training, much like today’s U.S. military training programs. The
techniques of applied psychology to training were built upon lessons learned in Korea
as well as upon the copious amounts of psychological research further examining
Skinner’s findings on operant conditioning. 132 Soldiers were trained to react to
external stimuli without thinking. 133 During marksmanship courses in World War II,
recruits often took prescribed positions, such as a prone firing posture, while calmly
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shooting at stationary bullseye-targets. A similar course during Vietnam had recruits
standing in foxholes while wearing a full load of battle gear. The recruits then waited
anxiously for a moving target to pop up at random, which allows the recruit only a
few moments to squeeze off a couple of rounds. If the recruit’s aim was true, a
satisfying sound from the bullet’s impact is heard, followed by the human-like target
collapsing backwards, just as a real human might. As Grossman points out, “The
method used to train today’s – and the Vietnam era’s – U.S. Army and USMC
soldiers is nothing more than an application of conditioning techniques to develop a
reflexive “quick shoot” ability.“ 134
Though marksmanship is being learned in this type of training, the recruit is
also learning the ability to shoot reflexively as well. Instantaneous action and
precision are taught, but more importantly the recruit is mimicking the precise action
of killing on a modern battlefield. The human-shaped moving targets appearing in
the field of fire is the “conditioned stimulus,” the immediate engagement of the target
by the recruit is “target behavior,” and a successful hit is rewarded by immediate
feedback (the sound or collapsing of the target). 135 This “positive reinforcement” can
also take the form of a token economy where badges, ribbons, medals, and weekend

134

Grossman, On Killing, 253. Grossman also states that in his two decades of service, he has never
heard an enlisted man, NCO, officer, or official document stating that conditioning is what was
occurring during marksmanship training, though that is exactly what is being achieved. At the time of
his writing this was probably true, however, a fair amount of studies and research on conditioning in
the military has surfaced in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
135
U.S. Department of the Army, Techniques of Military Instruction (Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1967), 41-43.

77

passes may be rewards for aggressively and accurately engaging the enemy (target),
or the recruit may receive praise, public recognition, or similar rewards. 136
The effort to make combat scenarios even more visceral has resulted in
ingenious devices that mimic killing. Uniforms filled with balloons that float across
the field and collapse once hit, jugs filled with red paint that explode on impact, raw
meat strewn about exercise courses, and oranges taped to sparring-dummies to
replicate the sensation of gouging eyes out, are only a few examples of many. Carlos
Hathcock, perhaps the most famous U.S. sniper in Vietnam with over 93 confirmed
kills, used conditioning techniques in training other snipers. Instead of using a
standard target during sniper practice, Hathcock taped a life-size picture of a man’s
face to the target and told his recruits to “Put three rounds inside the inside corner of
the right eye of the bad guy.” 137 Certainly, realism, reaction, and repetition have a
significant impact on the psychology of a recruit, and during training conditioned
responses to certain situations were ingrained into the soldier’s minds. How to
immediately react during an ambush is but one example. Though recruits often
scoffed at simplistic pre-determined reactions, when in the field, often these
conditioned responses saved the soldiers life. 138
Fort Polk, the “Home of the Infantry Soldier,” provides a good example of
realistic training combat infantry training during Vietnam. An infantry recruit spent
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eight weeks in basic training where they learned the fundamentals of marching, the
manual of arms, physical training, military customs, ranks, and procedures. After the
initial eight weeks, recruits were then sent on to another eight weeks of occupational
training. To assist in this, by 1963 the U.S. Army began using drill instructors and
committees to further enhance training. Drill instructors, experienced soldiers who
had proven accomplishments in the field, acted as mentors to the recruits, teaching
them what they could expect in battle. 139 Committees, or specialty instructors, would
train recruits in the specifics of infiltration, basic rifle marksmanship, night fighting,
close combat, and other general subjects such as first aid. Advanced Infantry
Training (AIT) had already been incorporated into U.S. combat training programs by
the end of the Korean War as a subsequent eight-week training course. After the
initial eight weeks at Fort Polk, it meant training at Tiger Land and Tiger Ridge.
Tiger Ridge was the location of a mock Vietnamese thatched-hut village, complete
with livestock and villagers (NCOs in costume). The recruits participated in
simulated patrols, search and destroy missions, confiscations, and intelligence
gathering that used Tiger Ridge as a realistic setting for what they could expect in
Vietnam. 140
The world’s best armies understand the importance of realistic training, and
modern infantry commanders generally understand the importance of immediate
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feedback for recruits, yet Grossman does not feel the drill instructors or leaders
necessarily understand “why” these training techniques are working and certainly not
what any long-term psychological consequences might be. He observed that many in
the U.S. military concerned with combat training do not care for the specifics of
conditioning, only that the methods used simply work. 141 Fundamentally, what
allows this type of training process to work is the same as what caused Pavlov’s dogs
to salivate at the sound of a bell, or Skinner’s rats to press a lever. Grossman believes
that the military has tapped into “The single most powerful and reliable behavior
modification process yet discovered by the field of psychology, and now applied to
the field of warfare: operant conditioning.” 142
Denial defense mechanisms are the last component of Grossman’s
conditioning-process triad. A rough definition of denial and defense mechanisms is
that they are unconscious methods for dealing with traumatic experiences. 143 A
simplified example can be observed in a soldier’s ability to disassociate with enemies
he has killed as something other than humans. Through careful repetition of the
killing process, a soldier is able to deny that he actually has killed another human
being, even if only suspending that belief temporarily. Rather, because of constantly
and carefully mimicking the act of killing, such as by shooting at E-type (man-shaped
target), the soldier is able to convince himself he has merely engaged a target. This
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subconsciously manufactured deniability when combined with conditioning is critical
in overcoming the disinclination to kill.144
To further illustrate denial defense mechanisms Grossman presents
statements from an interview with Bill Jordan a law-enforcement expert and veteran
of numerous gunfights. Jordan combines desensitization with denial defense when
advising new law-enforcement officers:
[There is] a natural disinclination to pull the trigger . . . when your
weapon is pointed at a human. Even though their own life was at stake,
most officers report having this trouble in their first fight. To aid in
overcoming this resistance it is helpful if you can will yourself to think
of your opponent as a mere target and not as a human being. In this
connection you should go further and pick a spot on the target. This
will allow better concentration and further remove the human element
from your thinking. If this works for you, try to continue this thought
in allowing yourself no remorse. A man who will resist an officer with
weapons has no respect for the rules by which decent people are
governed. He is an outlaw who has no place in world society. His
removal is completely justified, and should be accomplished
dispassionately and without regret. 145

Jordan is describing some key psychological concepts directly related to the triad, and
ultimately killology. First, he describes this thinking as manufactured contempt, and
as Grossman points out, “the combination of denial of, and contempt for, the victim’s
role in society (desensitization), along with the psychological denial of, and contempt
for, the victim’s humanity (developing a denial defense mechanism), is a mental
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process that is tied in and reinforced every time the officer fires a round at the
target.” 146
The combination of desensitization, operant conditioning and denial defense
mechanisms created a potent elixir of combat psychology through which it is clear,
soldiers in Vietnam were able to psychologically overcome most resistances to
killing. The kill ratio throughout the war, driven by a desire for body counts, is
evidence of a willingness to kill unleashed, even if considering the lowest reliable
averages. It is important to remember that ultimately only a small number of men
saw direct combat, and even fewer actually killed. It is likely that less than 30% of
those who served in Vietnam saw combat of any sort, and engagements were often
short, intense affairs where U.S. soldiers attempted to maximize casualties before the
enemy withdrew 147. However, improved training (especially, psychological
conditioning), technology, and tactics, meant that soldiers during Vietnam that made
direct contact with the enemy tended to fire their weapons, and had less inhibition
about killing than previous generations of U.S. soldiers. 148
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Results

There are three kinds of people who kill, from what I can discern in combat. For
some people, that first kill makes them almost sick. Physically ill. They really can't
deal with it. At the other extreme, there are those people who get that rush. It's the
supreme power act. It almost gives them a god complex. Some guys, when they do it,
they like it. They get hooked on killing just like they got hooked on heroin, and they
figure out a way to spend the rest of their life doing it. They may stay in the military
and become lifers. They may get out and become professional killers. Or they may
become killers for hire. But they got that rush, and it's addictive. In the middle, there
are guys who get that rush but fight with the moral conflict. When you're raised all
your life in the church, you go to Sunday school, you learn the Ten Commandments,
and 'Thou Shall Not Kill' is drilled into you. Then you're in the military, where your
job is now to kill.

—Washington Booker III, USMC Sniper

The training programs implemented by the U.S. military in the 1950s and
1960s were undoubtedly effective at preparing soldiers to enter into combat and kill.
Kill ratios, even when revised down for inflated body counts, remain at roughly a
three-to-two ratio of enemy combat deaths to U.S. and allied combat deaths
(including ARVN), and is evidence of the efficacy of modern technology, tactics, and
training in the U.S. military. 149 The effectiveness of conditioning when applied
through modern training techniques is evident in testimony from the soldiers
themselves, such as when Lonny finally declared during his video interview, “I
blasted ‘em. Silhouettes. They’re not real people, there are just targets!” When a
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U.S. colonel explained to Grossman his experience with killing in Vietnam, he said in
certain terms, “Two shots. Bam-Bam. Just like we had been trained in ‘quick kill.’
When I killed, I did it just like that. Just like I’d been trained. Without even
thinking.” 150 Other Vietnam veterans have described the killing sequence as
automatic or programmed—the result of modern training techniques. Further
examples of the efficacy of psychological conditioning can be found in the lopsided
kill ratios between the British and Argentinian rifleman during the Falklands War, or
between U.S. and Panamanian forces during the 1989 invasion of Panama. 151 In both
instances, the superior training of infantrymen conditioned through modern
techniques prevailed. A more recent example of superior combat infantry training is
available when looking at the Battle of Mogadishu in October, 1993. Elite U.S.
troops during Operation Gothic Serpent were ambushed in the capital of Somalia
while trying to apprehend the criminal warlord Mohammed Aidid, which resulted in a
prolonged close-combat battle. No artillery strikes, air strikes, armor, or heavy
weapons were available, rather it was a close-combat infantry duel. The poorly
trained and equipped Somali fighters were soundly defeated by the U.S. forces, losing
approximately 364, while the Americans suffered 18 KIA. 152
The success of conditioning, desensitization, and denial defense mechanisms
is clear: All other things being equal, when U.S. troops engage enemies that have not
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been subject to similar modern combat training, the result is victory. However, the
increased ratio of fire and disabling of psychological safeguards against killing
ostensibly comes with a hidden cost. 153 Turse might point to evidence of atrocities
committed against Vietnamese civilians as evidence of the danger associated with
removing mental constraints against killing. Grossman also warns about this
specifically:
During the Vietnam era millions of American adolescents were
conditioned to engage in an act against which they had a powerful
resistance. This conditioning is a necessary part of allowing a soldier
to succeed and survive in the environment where society has placed
him. If we accept that we need an army, then we must accept that it
has to be as capable of surviving as we can make it. But if society
prepares a soldier to overcome his resistance to killing and places him
in an environment in which he will kill, then that society has an
obligation to deal forthrightly, intelligently, and morally with the
psychological repercussions upon the soldier and the society. Largely
through an ignorance of the processes and implications involved, this
did not happen for Vietnam veterans—a mistake we risk making again
as the war in Iraq becomes increasingly deadly and unpopular. 154

With this in mind, there are two distinct lessons that can be drawn from killology
regarding Vietnam. First, the psychological triad of modern combat training works.
Second, there is a significant risk of psychological damage to recruits who are subject
to modern combat training techniques. Grossman continues:
The ability to increase the firing rate, though, comes with a hidden
cost. Severe psychological trauma becomes a distinct possibility when
military training overrides safeguards against killing: In a war when 95
153
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percent of soldiers fired their weapons at the enemy, it should come as
no surprise that between 18 and 54 percent of the 2.8 million military
personnel who served in Vietnam suffer from post-traumatic stress
disorder—far higher than in previous wars. 155

Historian Richard Gabriel asserts that Vietnam produced more psychiatric casualties
than any other war in U.S. history, pointing out, “The result was that at least 500,000
— perhaps as many as 1,500,000 — returning Viet Nam veterans suffered some
degree of psychiatric debilitation, called Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, an illness
which has become associated in the public mind with an entire generation of soldiers
sent to war in Vietnam.” 156
As dire a warning as Gabriel, Grossman, and others sharing their beliefs have
given regarding the potential for psychological damage, it was virtually inevitable
that the U.S. military continued to use and improve upon psychological conditioning
for enhancing combat performance. Though the U.S. military is now more aware of
the potential consequences of conditioning, especially with veterans who have seen
combat, it remains to be seen if re-sensitization methods will be effective in dealing
with PTSD and other consequences of combat. Veterans of Operation Desert Storm
and the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the global war on terror were
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and are trained using the same psychological-triad principles as recruits during the
Vietnam War, though the methods employed have simply become more advanced.

Chapter Four

Modern Combat: Infinite Possibilities

Now it was a matter of waiting for Bravo Company's soldiers to arrive on the scene,
and here they came, in Humvees and on foot, swarming across a thoroughly ruined
landscape. The battlefield was theirs now, from the main pile of bodies, to the trash
pile with Noor-Eldeen, to the shot-up houses and buildings, to the van--inside of
which, among the bodies, they discovered someone alive.

—David Finkel, The Good Soldiers

At a White House press briefing in April, 2010, seated in the front of the room
with a score of journalists, CNN reporter Jake Tapper calmly raised his hand. When
called upon by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, Tapper asked about
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events surrounding an incident that had occurred in a suburb of Baghdad on July 12,
2007. The incident in question involved the death of a dozen Iraqi civilians,
including two Reuters war correspondents, Saeed Chmagh and Namir Noor-Eldeen,
and two children. The U.S. military claimed they did not know what happened and
repeatedly denied requests from Reuters for information about the engagement. The
truth about the incident might have remained buried, as had happened with other
incidents in Iraq in which U.S. combatants with only a murky understanding of the
Rules of Engagement (ROE) targeted civilians in error. 157 However, Bradley
Manning, the U. S. Army intelligence analyst turned whistleblower, revealed the full
horror of the incident to the world. 158
Among the classified documents released by Manning to WikiLeaks before
his arrest was audio-video footage from a pair of AH-64 Apache helicopters
responsible for the death of the two Reuters journalists. The graphic nature of the
night vision video shocked the American public as it made news headlines across the
world. Much of the outrage pointed at the U.S. military was based on the poor ROE
protocol that allowed the pilots, ground teams, and commanders to misidentify the
civilians as enemy combatants, though there is still some dispute over whether the
group had been completely unarmed. While the failure to properly identify targets
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before engaging is disturbing, it is not an uncommon occurrence in warfare. Mistakes
happen, and innocents pay the price. Beyond the graphic images, what appalled
many in the United States and across the world was the audio recording of the
massacre, which provided a brief glimpse into the cruel reality of killing in modern
war. 159
The electronic image intensification sensors on the Apaches showed a cluster
of civilians in the middle of a road, ostensibly conversing and smoking cigarettes.
The black and white imaging of the weapon sensors added a sense of dread to the
video as it unfolded. “Just fuckin’ once you get on ‘em, just open ‘em up,” the lead
Apache pilot excitedly blurted out. “All right,” the gunner meekly replied. “You’re
clear!” the pilot shouted, his excitement evident in his voice. At this point the video
showed the electronic crosshairs of a 30mm cannon locked onto the group of men
conversing in the street. 160
Though the imagery the weapon-systems operator saw was detailed, there was
just enough digitization to add a surreal quality to the video; the humans about to die
might have been characters in a video game. “All right, firing,” the gunner
announced enthusiastically. A muted popping sound could be heard as the 30mm
cannons fired in an extended burst. A few seconds later, the group of men who had
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been conversing seemed to explode in a ball of dust as the rounds impacted. “Keep
shooting. Keep shooting. Keep shoot. Keep shoot.” the pilot screamed as he urged on
his gunner in words similar to the mantras that appeared in Army and United States
Marine Corps training programs during the Vietnam War. 161
A horrific scene emerged as the dust cleared from the initial strike. The
carnage wrought by the 30mm cannon left most of the men torn apart, with a few
severely wounded and still writhing in agony on the street. “All right, we just engaged
all eight individuals,” the pilot reported to the ground forces near the scene. “Oops,
I’m sorry, what was going on?” the gunner sardonically states. “God damn it Kyle”
the pilot shouted jokingly, making a reference to a character’s signature phrase from a
popular cartoon called South Park. The gunner laughed, “All right, I hit ‘em. I’m
just trying to find targets again.” 162
The dismounted infantry and the Apache pilots were not certain of the
presence of weapons among the civilians, though they claimed numerous AK-47
rifles and rocket propelled grenades were present. The escalation from identification
to engagement took two minutes. After the killing the military claimed weapons were
found among the civilians and were present in the videos. Further examination of the
video after its release showed what might have been a few rifles among the civilians.
However, what initially alerted Bushmaster-Six (the dismounted infantry) was the tri-
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pod and video equipment carried by Saeed Chmagh and Namir Noor-Eldeen.
Terribly wounded, Chmagh is then seen crawling away from the site of impact for
roughly a minute before a van pulls up to him and stops. The van belonged to Saleh
Mutashar, who had been driving his children Sajad and Doaha to their uncle’s home
before coming across Chmagh. In the video, Saleh can be seen rushing to Chmagh’s
aid in an effort to drag him into his vehicle before being killed alongside him a few
moments later. The van was also targeted by the lead Apache and riddled with 30mm
shells. 163
Individuals familiar with the principles of killology were likely aghast at the
graphic carnage wrought by the 30mm cannons, yet underlying this was something
perhaps more unsettling. An observant student of combat psychology might have
noticed that the exchange between the Apache crew members exhibited some key
elements of killology being applied on the modern battlefield. Specifically, one
might observe that psychological conditions were created that facilitated the attack
and allowed the crew to kill in such a seemingly callous or even joyful manner. To
highlight these principles at work, a simple deconstruction of the sequence of events
can be done.
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The Apache weapons system was effectively an aerial crew-serviced weapon.
The weapons systems on board the helicopters are designed with ground support in
mind, and if the main weapons are not firing, the Apache is nothing more than a
hovering, multimillion dollar target. The armaments of attack vehicles have trended
towards replacing the less mobile crew-serviced weapons of the past. In World War
II, a competent heavy machine-gun crew could inflict devastating casualties, but it
was limited by a relative lack of mobility. Armored personnel carriers, Bradley
fighting vehicles, and a wide array of attack helicopters fulfill the same role while
providing superior firepower and mobility. The Apache guns were expected to fire
because Bushmaster-Six depended on this tactical asset as another facet of U.S.
combined arms doctrine. 164
Expectations were also present in the form of sociological and psychological
influences. S.L.A. Marshall, David Hackworth, and other professional soldiers have
observed that the desire to avoid failing one’s comrades is what motivates most
soldiers to fight. Psychologists and sociologists have determined that humans in many
instances want to be valued as a useful member of their in-group. To satisfy this
need, soldiers are pressured to perform their duty under the watchful eye of their
fellow soldiers. Both the Apache pilot encouraging his gunner to fire and the
dismounted infantry were depending on his taking action. Not wanting to fail his
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comrades and peer pressure helped facilitate the gunner’s capacity to pull the trigger
of his weapon. He subsequently rose to the challenge and met expectations. 165
Proximity was a deciding factor for two reasons. First, the pilot of the Apache
(the ranking crewman) was situated physically near the gunner. Sociologists,
psychologists, and the U.S. military have determined that such an arrangement
reinforces authority, an important component that enables killing. 166 Sitting behind
and slightly elevated to the gunner, one can imagine the feeling of being under such
close physical observation while being yelled at to shoot. Physical proximity to the
target also played a key role during this attack. As Dave Grossman and others have
suggested, it is easier to kill at significant range because the target is less discernable,
and therefore less human. 167 Because the Apache crew was physically distant from
the targets, they were mostly insulated from the worst sensory aspects of the carnage.
The smells, sounds, and gore were not present, making the killing process easier.
Eerily glowing white against the darkened urban backdrop, the humans were
merely silhouettes when portrayed through the modern weapons sensors designed by
Lockheed Martin. 168 Just as many Vietnam combat veterans were conditioned
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through training to view the enemy as nothing more than silhouette targets, the
gunner of the Apache had technological assistance to achieve this same effect. The
gunner viewed the targets through the additional medium of computerized imagery,
making makes killing easier still. The electronic “filter” between the gunner and his
targets provided psychological “cover” that enabled him to more easily disassociate
his victims from flesh-and-blood humans, since he saw them as digital proxies from
the controlled environment of a helicopter cockpit. The effect was a technological
version of dehumanization. A similar situation occurs during an execution when a
hood is placed over the target’s head. This simultaneously spares the executioners the
emotional trauma caused by seeing the victim’s face, making it easier to kill the
nondescript individual who is now seemingly less human. 169 U.S. soldiers during
both Gulf Wars and in Afghanistan also used racialized terms for their opponents, just
as they had in previous wars. This created a further emotional distance from the
enemy. Terms such as “raghead” or “hajji” replaced “gook” and “kraut” in the
language of U.S. soldiers and their Western allies during the Gulf Wars and in
Afghanistan as a method to make them part of the out-group and therefore easier to
kill. The digitized medium of weapon sensors achieved a similar effect. 170
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Unfortunately for the infantry first on the scene after the attack, the tragedy
could not have been more real. Inside the wreckage of Saleh’s van, both his children
were severely injured. Ethan McCord was the first infantryman to notice the injured
children, acted swiftly in removing them from the van. McCord carried their broken
bodies one by one to a nearby Bradley fighting vehicle for medical attention, despite
being yelled at by an NCO to secure the perimeter. After learning about the injured
children, the crew of the Apache responsible responded with “Ah damn. Oh well."
followed by, "Well, it's their fault for bringing kids into a battle." 171 The chilling
response to the tragedy only fueled the social and political condemnation faced by the
U.S. Army and the White House. Manning was arrested, convicted, and is currently
serving time at the Marine Corps Brig in Quantico, Virginia for his role in the leak,
but none of the Apache pilots or ground forces involved faced disciplinary charges of
any kind. The U.S. Army did release two reports on the incident, but ultimately
decided not to reopen the investigation, despite criticism from some in the media and
government. 172
After that day, McCord claimed he became traumatized by the scene, stating,
"The first thing I thought of ...was my children at home." 173 He asked for medical
treatment for his psychological trauma, but instead was ridiculed by his NCO. He
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suffered from severe post-traumatic stress as a result and is currently on a long road
to recovery. This was perhaps the final principle of killology to be observed from the
July 12 incident. Though the carnage wrought seemed to have minimal impact on the
Apache pilots, the aftermath of the slaughter significantly impacted those who had a
front row seat to the horror. Without mitigating factors such as increased physical
proximity and digitally enhanced dehumanization, even those not directly responsible
for the act of killing faced potential mental and emotional consequences as
witnesses. 174
Killology and the Modern U.S. Army

Warrior Ethos refers to the professional attitudes and beliefs that will
characterize you. Developed through discipline, commitment to Army Values and
knowledge of the Army’s proud heritage, Warrior Ethos notes military service as
much more than just a “job” — it is a profession with the enduring purpose to win
wars and destroy our nation’s enemies.

—FM 3-21.8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad

The Apache attack on July 12, 2007 would have looked completely different
only decade earlier. The fire control system, armaments, and electronics suite would
have been inferior on all points, as was proven by a government field test in which a
small group of modern prototypes (AH-64D) handily defeated a numerically superior
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force of the older models (AH-64A). 175 The imbalance in combat power between the
helicopter variants was the result of advances in emergent technology during the
Information Age. Starting in the 1990s, the blossoming of advanced computer
technology meant that military vehicles such as the modern Apache variants could
carry a more sophisticated targeting system, more intuitive electronics, and a more
powerful damage control system. The computer and a myriad of other technologies
have irrevocably changed the nature of combat and redefined modern warfare. This
chapter defines modern warfare as the period from 1990 to present and primarily
examines the backbone of America’s ground forces, the U.S. Army.
Since the end of the Vietnam War, the integration of killology principles into
modern combat training programs has been an organic process more than a deliberate
one. It is likely that Grossman himself would be hard pressed to identify any one
significant act that had the effect of revolutionizing the U.S. military’s ability to train
violence-averse soldiers to kill. This same process occurred after World War II when
the U.S. Army began restructuring units, providing better equipment, better training
programs, and better instruction. This multifaceted approach took twenty years but
ultimately resulted in a 90% ratio of fire by U.S. soldiers in combat during the
Vietnam War. 176 Since the 1970s, this type of organic process has continued to
reshape and refine the U.S. military into its current form, albeit with some notable
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exceptions. For example, the formal establishment of an all-volunteer military in
1973 marked a significant development towards enhancing combat effectiveness,
because volunteers almost uniformly perform better in combat than conscripts. 177,178
The move to an all-volunteer force also meant that personnel could not be wasted on
menial tasks like peeling potatoes, like it had been during the elevated troop levels
during the era of the draft. Instead civilian contactors were beginning to be used to
fill the more menial roles, a situation that is even more prevalent today. 179 The U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was also formed during this
period in an effort to redefine the Army’s mission, improve organization, and as a
proactive means of creating better methods of instruction. TRADOC also lead the
development of the Army’s new doctrine known as AirLand Battle, a concept that
focused on combined arms maneuver warfare and flexibility in order to meet the
shifting political challenges of the Cold War and beyond. 180
Though not as flashy as a new doctrine like AirLand Battle, the field manuals
produced by TRADOC since 1973 leave a trail of clues about the adaptive nature of
the U.S. Army and a willingness to embrace new ideas. These new field manuals
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illustrate small changes that have been made over time in response to shifting
battlefield conditions, and they appear to be tied to some concepts presented in
killology. Seemingly minor changes to the manuals over the last few decades provide
some evidence of the adaptive and organic nature of military tactical planning,
specifically when examining the infantry.
Field Manuel 7-8 (FM 7-8), The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad Leader,
jokingly referred to as “the Bible” by infantrymen, was approved and released by the
Department of the Army in 1992. Section 1 is titled “Mission” and describes the
basic role of combat infantry:
The mission of the infantry is to close with the enemy by means of fire
and maneuver to defeat or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire,
close combat, and counterattack. . . . Despite any technological
advantages that our armed forces might have over an enemy, only
close combat between ground forces gains the decision in battle.
Infantry rifle forces (infantry, airborne, air assault, light, and ranger)
have a key role in close combat situations. 181

In 2007, TRADOC issued a significantly revised version of FM 7-8 titled FM
3-21.8. FM 3-21.8 was a response to the rapidly changing technological and
battlefield conditions U.S. soldiers faced in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and it
was grounded in lessons learned during the early stages of the wars in Afghanistan
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and Iraq. Some interesting changes pertaining to the role of the individual soldier are
immediately noticeable:
The Infantry’s primary role is close combat, which may occur in any
type of mission, in any theater, or environment. Characterized by
extreme violence and physiological shock, close combat is callous and
unforgiving. Its dimensions are measured in minutes and meters, and
its consequences are final. Close combat stresses every aspect of the
physical, mental, and spiritual features of the human dimension. . . .
Infantry are particularly susceptible to the harsh conditions of combat,
the effects of direct and indirect fire, the physical environment, and
moral factors. 182

The description of the infantry mission in FM 3-2.8 specifically acknowledges that
soldiers will be faced with situations that are filled with “extreme violence,” and
“physiological shock.” Close combat is described as “callous and unforgiving.” The
last sentence in particular indicates that U.S. Army tactical planners had embraced the
most fundamental concept of killology: humans, especially infantry, are extremely
susceptible to the horrors of combat. There is no mention of what conditions a soldier
will likely face in combat in the equivalent section of FM 7-8. Though hardly
conclusive, seemingly insignificant changes in how the U.S. Army perceives the
rigors of battle are noteworthy.
The U.S. Army showed that it had begun to integrate more sophisticated
elements of combat psychology into its modern instruction as well. Realism has been
a major component in effective training during and since the Vietnam War, as Fort
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Polk’s Tiger Land and Tiger Ridge infantry training courses demonstrated. Realistic
training was more effective. 183 FM 25-100, entitled Training the Force, was issued in
1988, and it contained instructions that definitively stated that realism in training was
essential to good combat performance. This is clearly seen a section entitled, “Train
as You Fight”:
The goal of combat-level training is to achieve combat-level standards.
Every effort must be made to attain this difficult goal. Within the
confines of safety and common sense, leaders must be willing to
accept less than perfect results initially and demand realism in training.
They must integrate such realistic conditions as smoke, noise,
simulated NBC, battlefield debris, loss of key leaders, and cold
weather. 184
FM 25-100 undoubtedly encouraged the use of realism in combat training and
changed the way the Army trained. Smoke, noise, debris, command
disruption, and the weather were all recommended props that helped achieve a
high level of combat simulation. The same principal in killology that
suggested human silhouette pop-up targets are superior for training to that of
unrealistic bulls-eye targets. 185, 186
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In 2008, FM 7-0 Training for Full Spectrum Operations was released
as an update of the aging FM 25-100. FM 7-0 was the U.S. Army’s
standardized training doctrine, and was applicable throughout the force until
2016. It provided authoritative foundations for individual, leadership, and
unit training, and contained language familiar to students of combat
psychology. In section 2-32, entitled “Make Training Performance Oriented,
Realistic, and Mission Focused,” not only does the manual recommend
realism, but it encouraged the use of physical and psychological props or
“enablers” during training to create as authentic an experience as possible:
Effective training incorporates conditions that allow execution of both
core capability and general mission-essential tasks using lethal and
nonlethal actions to adapt to different situations. . . . As operational
environments become more complex and resources (such as time,
money, land, and airspace) become scarcer, the value of live, virtual,
constructive, and gaming training enablers increases. These enablers
enhance training effectiveness by replicating the conditions of an
actual operational environment. Leaders are responsible for integrating
and effectively using training aids, devices, simulators, and
simulations (TADSS) to enhance realism. 187
Clearly the U.S. Army had embraced some key concepts of combat
psychology as shown in the training literature and field manuals. The most
recent edition of FM 7-0, entitled Train to Win in a Complex World, released
in 2016, builds upon the foundations of the training methods prescribed in the
2008 edition. In addition, it more fully integrates digital training methods into
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the normal training regimen, stating, “Commanders leverage available
resources, to include the mix of live, virtual, and constructive (LVC) training
enablers.” 188 The use of technology throughout the FM 7-0 is emphasized
much more than in previous versions and it frequently references many
available programs that make substantial use of digital, laser, satellite, and
computer systems. Still, the question of what might have encouraged this
shift towards a more comprehensive understanding of combat must be
addressed. What influenced the change in combat theory and training?
By 2007, David Grossman’s On Killing: The Psychological Cost of
Learning to Kill in War and Society had become an accepted part of modern
military combat training. Cadets at West Point were required to read
Grossman’s work, and it was also selected by the Commandant of the Marine
Corps as mandatory reading for Marines. It is likely that Grossman’s effort
towards understanding killing played a significant role in the creation of FM
3-21.8, if only for the amount of attention he brought to the matter. Of course,
Grossman alone is not responsible for the shifting theories on killing in
combat, but his ideas were specifically utilized and taught at various levels of
the U.S. military.
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A 2007 interview with the commanders of the Observer Trainer
Mentor (OTM) Leadership Training Program demonstrates the significance
combat veterans placed on killology in preparing untested soldiers for battle.
The OTM was designed to to teach leaders how to think, not what to think. In
2006, over 2,600 officers and NCOs passed through the program, which is
taught by both combat veterans and soldiers who have not seen combat. A
course on killology is taught on the first morning of OTM, but this one is
always taught by a veteran with a combat patch. This is the only course in
this training program with such a requirement. An interview with the ranking
officer and NCO was conducted by the Combat Studies Institute as part of a
report on the GWOT. Both Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Olsen, and First
Sergeant David Atkins speak highly of the killology course:
The killology class is to get everybody in the right mindset. I talk
about what happened to me during the Iron Claw mission, and I can
tell you that as you’re preparing for the mission and as you go out of
the wire, shit happens. Your adrenaline goes up and down. When
you’re over there and go through a mission and you lose a buddy or
somebody in the squad, there are a lot of assets for the soldiers to tap
into to get help, but there’s still something missing. Sometimes you
can’t get the right answers from the stress management group or from
the chaplains group that comes down and works with the unit. I lost
soldiers when I was in theater and I never had anything like this, so
when it happened to me there were so many other things happening,
everything was pretty crazy, and all my guys were going through these
different phases. I knew why it happened but I never really understood
why. 189
U.S. Department of the Army, Combat Studies Institute, Operational Leadership Experiences
Project (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007),13.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll13/id/390, accessed September 28, 2016.
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The OTM also included a program known as Operation Warrior Trainer for mobilized
National Guard members who come back from theater and who continued to train
other soldiers deploying to theater. The “Warriors” were the seasoned combat
veterans providing instruction. Notably, the term “warrior” started becoming more
prevalent in the Army’s training and recruitment literature. Grossman briefly
discussed the warrior’s frame of mind in On Killing, and it was a prominent theme in
his 2008 publication On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict
in War and in Peace. Grossman believes that a protector-archtype is the preferable
role of fighting men who are sworn to defend their people and their state. 190 The
warrior ethos is an important part of psychologically preparing people for the both
trials of combat and its aftermath. 191
Not long after the publication of On Killing, the warrior ethos became a
central component of the modern Army’s training program. A section added to FM
3-21.8 that had not been included in FM 7-8 was entitled “Warrior Ethos and Army
Values.” It stressed the importance of professionalism, defining the soldier’s role as
something more elevated than a mere job. Instead, being a soldier in the U.S. Army
was more of a calling. To illustrate this new concept, the Soldier’s Creed was
included as an outline of core Army beliefs:
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I am an American Soldier. I am a warrior and a member of a team. I
serve the people of the United States, and live the Army Values. I will
always place the mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never
quit. I will never leave a fallen comrade. I am disciplined, physically
and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and
drills. . . . I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life. I
am an American Soldier. 192

The Soldier’s Creed was approved in 2003, and by the release of FM 3-21.8 was
already widely used throughout the U.S. Army in training. 193 Though the warriorarchetype is common to many societies throughout history, the crystallization of this
mindset into formal training material is new. The observance of key “warrior virtues”
by the U.S. Army were fundamental to ingraining concrete ideas of duty and
sacrifice, both traits that enable killing. The continued effort to improve combat
performance meant the U.S. Army was always searching for knowledge that further
professionalized its modern force, and appeared to have embraced key concepts that
were developed by military scientists, psychologists, and veterans.
The TRADOC archives, the Combined Arms Research Library, and the
Combat Studies Institute each contain thousands of documents about training and
combat efficiency. When viewed chronologically, these field manuals, training
programs, and other documents provide a trail of clues. Like any other organization
that learns as it goes, the U.S. Army is susceptible to the zeitgeist of modern war,
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which more than ever relies upon science and technology to achieve objectives. In
this context, the Army’s interest in the principles outlined in killology is clear.
Grossman and others like him who share a similar mission to improve human
understanding of combat and killing have successfully contributed to the Army’s
development of better training methods. Unfortunately, there is a psychological price
paid by the soldiers who endure training techniques that improve lethality. Modern
military training is not an unalloyed positive.
New Frontiers

The aim of the missions was to track, and when the conditions were deemed right, kill
suspected insurgents. That’s not how they put it, though. They would talk about
“cutting the grass before it grows out of control”, or “pulling the weeds before they
overrun the lawn”. And then there were the children. The airmen would be flying the
Predators over a village in the tribal areas of Pakistan, say, when a series of smaller
black shadows would appear across their screens – telling them that kids were at the
scene. They called them “fun-sized terrorists.”
—Michael Haas, Drone Operator, U.S. Air Force

The 2007 video of the Apache attack was horrific for its visceral quality, yet
just as chilling to some was the video-game like quality of the weapons systems
operated by the Apache gunner. The feeling that the gunner was in a hyper-realistic
virtual reality game is understandable, because that is exactly how the modern U.S.
military is training many of its members. Powerful computers and sophisticated
electronics are the byproducts of the information age, and military forces around the
globe benefitted from enhanced technological capabilities. The U.S. Army and Air
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Force both moved quickly to upgrade their forces, something that was particularly
evident in the adoption of virtual training, and drone combat technology.
Killology stresses both a realistic training environment and the use of
operant conditioning to promote a reflexive fighting response to external
threats in soldiers. Modern combat simulators and other technology-based
training equipment filled this role well, and the Army encouraged the use of
these types of resources when possible. The 2008 publication of FM 7-0
provides some indication of the future direction of Army combat training. A
section on training resources summarizes many methods of more effective
training that were not available even a decade earlier:
A combination of live, virtual, constructive, and gaming training
enablers can help replicate an actual operational environment. Based
on resources available—such as time, fuel, funds, and training areas—
commanders determine the right mix of live, virtual, constructive, and
gaming training enablers to effectively and efficiently train for a
mission or rehearse an operation. 194

The U.S. military made good use of combat training centers (CTCs) and other
facilities in which the latest in simulation technology was included in training.
The field manuals and training courses reflect a shift towards computer
enhanced training and VR. The Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) is a
computer based VR program that aids vehicle formations equipped with the
Reconfigurable Vehicle Simulator (RVS) and Reconfigurable Vehicle
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Tactical Trainer (RVTT). These provide realistic vehicle cabs,
communications equipment, and weapons in a virtual training environment.
In short, computers and VR are used to replicate an armored infantry column
one day and a mounted infantry battalion the next. All of this training
involves high degree of realism; it also promotes conditioned responses while
maintaining a high degree of realism and intensity. 195
The type of training offered by VR programs and other computerbased training modules meets the need for realism in effective combat
training. However, a more controversial aspect of combat simulations can be
found in claims from medical and psychological professionals that using a
video game environment in psychological conditioning lowers humans’
normal resistance to acts of violence. A twenty-year study conducted by the
American Psychological Association found that violent video games and
violent behavior are linked:
The research demonstrates a consistent relation between violent video
game use and increases in aggressive behavior, aggressive cognitions
and aggressive affect, and decreases in prosocial behavior, empathy
and sensitivity to aggression. . . Scientists have investigated the use of
violent video games for more than two decades but to date, there is
very limited research addressing whether violent video games cause
people to commit acts of criminal violence. . . However, the link

“Virtual Training Benefits Teams to Battalions,” Stand-To, May 20, 2010,
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between violence in video games and increased aggression in players
is one of the most studied and best established in the field 196

The use of advanced technology in wargame and battle simulators had a direct
impact on aggression, and as Grossman has argued, facilitated killing. 197 In
an effort to hone skills, the U.S.M.C. adapted a popular first-person shooter
video game called Doom almost immediately after such software became
available. This game allowed trainees to improve reaction time in a realistic
and changing environment. The Army followed suit in 2002 when it took the
extraordinary measure of developing its own video game, called America’s
Army. 198 America’s Army was a success in civilian markets, and various
applications have been developed by the U.S. Army for specialized training
using the game as a platform. Simulation software is used by the U.S.
military in many aspects of training because the psychological conditions that
allow an individual to more easily overcome resistance to killing are met by
elements of VR and video games. 199 Yet, perhaps the ultimate example of the
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intersectionality between video games, psychological conditioning, and
advanced technology, can be found by examining unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) programs in the U.S. Air Force, otherwise known as drone
programs. 200,201
Ultra-modern, incredibly sophisticated, accurate within reason, and
effective, drones represented a pinnacle of killing technology when viewed in
the context of combat psychology. The attraction of drones and robots for
military scientists is their capacity to destroy targets remotely. Currently the
Pentagon has around 7,000 UAVs compared with fewer than 50 a decade
ago. 202 “Ever step on ants and never give it another thought? That’s what you
are made to think of the targets – as just black blobs on a screen. You start to
do these psychological gymnastics to make it easier to do what you have to do
– they deserved it, they chose their side. You had to kill part of your
conscience to keep doing your job every day – and ignore those voices telling
you this wasn’t right.” 203 This is how Michael Haas, former Air Force drone
operator described his experience delivering drone payloads onto targets.
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Haas described other euphemisms for killing in the drone program, such as
“cutting the grass before it grows out of control,” and “pulling weeds before
they overrun the lawn.” 204 Dehumanizing the enemy is a vital component of
combat psychology and the drone program encouraged “manufactured
contempt.” 205 The difference between drone operators and ground units
directly involved in combat is that the drone operators never have to smell,
see, or hear the results of their handiwork. 206
Grossman calls violent shooter video games “murder simulators” and
believed them to be a significant factor in conditioning and desensitizing
humans in order to kill. The operation of drones is not unlike a video game,
there is a monitor with a crosshair, the targets are seen through a digital
medium, and the UAV is controlled with a joystick. Fundamentally, the
psychological enablers that allowed the Apache crew to kill with no outward
signs of remorse are exemplified in drone combat, and most indications point
toward an even greater use of remote controlled weapon systems that provide
significant potential to override human resistance to killing. The increasing
use of weapons systems that harness the psychological conditions needed to
make killing easier appear to have solved the problem faced by infantrymen
throughout history. It is no longer necessary to thrust a sword into an
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opponent’s gut or level a musket at a line of soldiers twenty yards away.
Technological innovation seems to have solved the fundamental problem with
killing—the human element.
Or has it? The most encouraging news for those concerned about the
ethical and moral implications of the U.S. military using advanced weapons
technology coupled with conditioning techniques to create hardened killers
comes from those presumably most insulated from the visceral reality of war:
the drone operators themselves. A study released in 2013 by the Armed
Forces Health Surveillance Branch found that pilots of drone aircraft
experience mental health problems like depression, anxiety and post-traumatic
stress at the same rate as pilots of manned aircraft who are deployed to Iraq or
Afghanistan. 207 The operators were not as insulated from the psychological
impact of killing as had been thought. The irony is that despite providing
ideal psychological conditions, generally people still abhor killing other
people.
What had started with Marshall’s controversial observation that men in
combat were generally unwilling to fire their weapons at another human being
prompted a seventy-year investigation by military scientists and psychologists
into understanding the psychology of killing. The burgeoning science of
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killology has carried the flame in this endeavor. Grossman’s serious attempt
at explaining the physiological and emotional impact of killing is not a perfect
one, but it makes strides toward understanding how humans can overcome an
inherent aversion to killing. The myriad changes in military doctrine, tactics,
and training since World War II reveal a serious effort to incorporate many
concepts put forth in killology in pursuit of creating efficient soldiers. 208
Ironically, for an organization like the U.S. Army that has worked diligently
towards preparing soldiers to kill, the 2016 release of FM 7-0 Train to Win in
a Complex World does not mention the word killing once. 209 Ultimately,
science and technology have gone far towards understanding and overcoming
killing, yet UAVs and Apaches will never win wars on their own. In the near
future the role of the ground troops will likely remain unchanged; they will
still be asked by their country to give their lives as necessity or circumstances
dictate, just as they will be asked to take lives as their training and conscience
allows. The latter of these realities can be most troubling for those who have
taken life.
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